Pedagogic War with Vietnam } 387
interlocutors that China’s punishment of Vietnam would be limited in scope
and duration.^10 Shortly after Deng returned from his Southeast Asian visits,
the PLA General Staff Department convened another planning session. The
result was a plan for much broader operations against Vietnam, including
attacks on all cities and military positions along the SRV border. Strategic
reserves totaling four armies and one division were shifted from Wuhan and
Chengdu for the attack. The CMC met again on December 7 to consider and
approve the PLA plan.^11 It then issued orders to relevant Military Regions
directing them to prepare for offensive military operations into the SRV
to a distance of 50 kilometers and for a duration of two weeks. Finally, on
December 31, 1978, shortly after being designated China’s paramount leader
at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee, Deng formally proposed to
the CMC a “self-defensive counterattack” against Vietnam along the lines of
the PLA plan. The war would be short and swift, with Chinese forces with-
drawing once the capture of Lang Son had been achieved. Chinese forces
would thus avoid becoming bogged down or give the Soviet Union a chance
to intervene. In addition to approving the PLA and Deng’s war plan, the CMC
appointed Xu Shiyou commander of the eastern Guangxi sector and Yang
Dezhi commander of the western sector in Yunnan. Above them there was no
unitary commander, only the CMC. This proved to be a serious shortcoming,
with the two sectors fighting virtually independent wars.
A major concern was the level of PLA readiness to fight an actual war. The
PLA had not fought a war since 1962 with India, seventeen years before, and
had spent most of the 1965–1977 period deeply enmeshed in China’s politics
and civil administration. Military training had been given short shrift during
the Cultural Revolution. Large-scale military operations and maneuvers had
been few. Out of such concerns, Deng dispatched the director of the General
Logistics Department, Zhang Zhen, to inspect the gathering Chinese forces.
Zhang was shocked by what he saw, and on his return to Beijing he recom-
mended delaying the war by a month to permit intensified training. This pro-
posal was accepted, shifting the start of the offensive to mid-February.
Another serious concern was possible Soviet intervention. The USSR and
the SRV had signed a treaty of peace and friendship in November 1978. Article
Six of that treaty provided that “If either side is attacked or exposed to the
threat of attack, the two signatory parties will immediately confer with each
other in order to remove the threat and take appropriate and effective steps to
safeguard the peace and security of both countries.”^12 If Moscow did not take
action to follow through on this treaty obligation, it would lose considerable
credibility. Moreover, Vietnam had become Moscow’s close political and mil-
itary partner; failure to stand beside Hanoi could endanger that relationship,
including especially Soviet access to military bases in Vietnam. Still, Chinese
leaders found several reasons to conclude that forceful Soviet intervention
was not likely. The brevity of the Chinese strike would end the conflict before