The Strategic Triangle } 409
had to make pious noises to the effect that US-Chinese normalization had
nothing to do with US-Soviet rivalry.” But in fact, “We were convinced that a
genuinely cooperation relation between Washington and Beijing would ....
be to US advantage in the global competition with the Soviet Union ... the
timing of normalization was definitely influenced by the Soviet dimension.”^20
From Beijing’s perspective, deterring a Soviet military response to China’s
upcoming lesson to Vietnam was a key triangular objective vis-à-vis the
United States in early 1979. Hanoi hoped that the threat of Soviet intervention
conveyed by the November 1978 treaty would deter a Chinese military re-
sponse to Vietnam’s upcoming invasion and occupation of Cambodia. From
Moscow’s perspective, conclusion of a military alliance with Vietnam was
a major step toward expansion of the Soviet military presence in Southeast
Asia. This was precisely why Beijing and Washington took umbrage at the
treaty. But having put Soviet credibility on the line by signing the treaty with
Hanoi, failure to intervene on behalf of its client Vietnam against China
would entail serious loss of credibility of the Soviet Union with its allies. This
meant that, in the event of a Sino-Vietnamese war, there would be strong
pressure on Moscow to act militarily in support of Vietnam. Beijing sought in
January 1979 to obtain US support that would help deter Soviet intervention
in China’s upcoming war with Vietnam.
During private and highly confidential discussions with Carter in
Washington during January 1979, Deng informed the American president of
China’s decision for war with Vietnam and the reasons for that decision. But
Deng assured Carter that China’s upcoming lesson to Vietnam would be lim-
ited in geographic scope and time. This hour-long small-group discussion
had been preceded by a full day’s larger group discussion during which, ac-
cording to Brzezinski, “Deng minced no words, and after a vigorous denunci-
ation of Soviet activities in the Middle East and southern Asia, he urged joint
American-Chinese cooperation against the Soviets, though carefully adding
that he was not proposing at this stage a formal alliance.”^21 The United States
and China had a common enemy and therefore should collaborate closely,
Deng told the Americans. Regarding the possibility of Soviet intervention
in the upcoming war, China had considered this “worst [case] possibility,”
Deng told Carter, and even then China would hold out and proceed to ad-
minister its lesson to Vietnam. China had considered all the alternatives and
had concluded that failure to punish Vietnam would simply allow Hanoi and
Moscow to run amuck in Southeast Asia. Sometimes one had to do things one
would prefer not to do, Deng told Carter. He did not expect US endorsement
of China’s upcoming war, Deng told Carter. He desired only “moral support”
from the United States.
Carter and his team took an evening to consider the matter and replied
to Deng the next day. The United States could not condone open military at-
tack by any country on another, Carter explained. Moreover, a Chinese attack