410 { China’s Quest
on Vietnam would generate international sympathy for Vietnam, making
more difficult the isolation of Vietnam over its aggression against Cambodia.
A Chinese assault against Vietnam would undermine US domestic support
for normalization of relations with the PRC. Deng listened carefully and
noted what Carter did not say—that the United States would openly con-
demn China’s upcoming lesson. After Carter finished his presentation, Deng
expressed appreciation for Carter’s comments, but reiterated his view that
China found it necessary to “teach Vietnam a lesson.” That “lesson” would
last only ten to twenty days, Deng said. Carter told Deng he wanted China to
understand that the US position was not based on fear of the Soviet Union, but
on a belief that it would be better to work to internationally isolate Vietnam
and the Soviet Union. Deng concluded that it was good to have a friend with
whom such things could be discussed so frankly. Carter also offered Deng
an intelligence briefing on the disposition of Soviet forces around China’s
periphery—an offer which Deng “eagerly accepted,” according to Carter.^22
Brzezinski worked out a formal US position on the war, carefully designing
it to look even-handed but in fact tilting toward Beijing. The United States
called for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam and of Vietnamese
troops from Cambodia. An appeal for withdrawal by both countries looked
even-handed. Of course, the United States knew that China planned to with-
draw its forces in ten to twenty days, while Vietnam’s forces in Cambodia
were digging in to stay for years. Once China’s forces launched their ped-
agogic war, Washington sent several messages to Moscow subtly crafted to
deter Soviet intervention. One message urged the Soviet Union to take no
action to exacerbate the situation. The United States was prepared to act in
a similar matter, the US note said. Implicit in this note, Brzezinski noted,
was the message that the United States was prepared to act militarily if the
Soviet Union so acted. The United States also closely monitored Soviet mil-
itary moves during the war and warned the Soviet Union that any “organ-
ized Soviet military presence” in Vietnam would force the United States to
reevaluate its security position in the Far East. This formulation, Brzezinski
noted, carried the hint of wider US-PRC security relations.^23
Washington used its emerging triangular leverage with Moscow in regions
outside Southeast Asia. In December 1980, as Soviet forces were marshaling
on Poland’s borders in preparation for an invasion to oust a reformist commu-
nist government ruling that country, Brzezinski ordered the US Department
of State to draw up a list of weapons to be transferred to China in the event of
a Soviet invasion. “I felt fairly confident,” Brzezinski reported, “that the sub-
stance of the memorandum would rapidly become more publicly known.”^24
As Carter said in May 1980, “It is not bad for the Soviets to think that there is
an embryonic US-Chinese military relation.”^25
China’s decision to align closely with the United States in the strategic tri-
angle soon paid off for the end goals of the Four Modernizations—national