416 { China’s Quest
results of those elections would determine the composition of Cambodia’s
future government. Implicit in this proposal was the assumption that in gen-
uinely free elections, the Khmer Rouge would receive very few votes. Without
votes or arms, the Khmer Rouge would thus be reduced to a minor role in
post-withdrawal Cambodian politics. This plan would ultimately be adopted
in 1990 and form the basis for successful settlement of the Cambodian ques-
tion. But in 1981, both Beijing and Washington were opposed to it. The time
was not yet right. Pressure on Hanoi needed to be maintained a while longer.
According to Beijing during the 1980s, the ASEAN proposal would con-
stitute international interference in Cambodia’s internal affairs. Elections
were fine, Beijing said, but they should be organized by Cambodia’s Khmer
Rouge–led government. Cambodia’s legal government, again including the
Khmer Rouge, should administer Cambodia once the Vietnamese withdrew.
As for disarmament, possession and utilization of military force were core
elements of national sovereignty. Cambodia’s legitimate government could
not be denied military forces. While founded on traditional legal notions of
state sovereignty, the political essence of Beijing’s proposal seems to have been
a Khmer Rouge return to power—albeit chastened and less extreme. In 1981,
Washington opposed the ASEAN proposal in tandem with China, mainly be-
cause of a commitment to triangular partnership with Beijing. Once George
Shultz became secretary of state in July 1982, however, US policy shifted to
support for the ASEAN proposal. Shultz did not believe US interests, moral
or geopolitical, would be served by a Khmer Rouge return to power or armed
bid for power. Shultz was also less enthusiastic than Haig about the utility
of triangular cooperation with the PRC. Still, PRC-US partnership over
Cambodia continued until Vietnam finally became ready to withdraw in- Fortunately, by that time Beijing was willing to embrace the ASEAN
proposal of 1981.
Turning to Afghanistan, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, immediately
after the Soviet occupation of that country in December 1979 the Carter ad-
ministration began a discussion with Pakistan about a joint response to the
Soviet move that would “make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long
as ... possible.”^34 President Carter signed several presidential findings that
authorized covert US operations to supply munitions and other support to
Afghan resistance to kill Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan—the first presiden-
tial authorization of lethal covert operations since the Vietnam War.^35 In a
manner similar to Sino-American cooperation in Cambodia, the PRC and
the United States jointly supported and protected a front-line state, in this
case Pakistan, that was willing to allow its territory to be used as sanctuary by
resistance fighters. Refugee camps were established in areas of Pakistan bor-
dering Afghanistan, and those camps served as bases for the armed resistance
struggle inside Afghanistan. The covert war in Afghanistan did not emerge
full-blown all at once, but evolved through several stages. The PRC played