418 { China’s Quest
Hua was in Islamabad, US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown traveled to
Beijing to discuss joint assistance to Pakistan. In those talks, Beijing agreed to
supply small arms to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and to increase the supply of
heavy weapons to Pakistan.^38 Although the details of these Sino-Pakistan-US
discussions are still unavailable, the broad outlines are clear: the three coun-
tries were undertaking to support an Afghan armed resistance to Russian
occupation, with Washington and Beijing jointly agreeing to uphold Pakistan
security against Soviet incursions or even all-out invasion.
A PLA “goodwill” delegation visited Islamabad in April. After several
rounds of talks, Vice Defense Minister Xiao Ke told reporters that China
would “resolutely support Pakistan in its struggle to defend its sovereignty
and territorial integrity.”^39 President Zia visited Beijing in May to receive au-
thoritative guarantees of Pakistan’s security. In his banquet speech for Zia,
Premier Hua Guofeng, speaking for China, declared: “The Chinese govern-
ment and people will, as always, firmly support you in your struggle in de-
fense of national independence and state sovereignty and will stand firmly
together with you against foreign aggression and interference.”^40 By late
1980, sizable quantities of Chinese air defense missiles and jet fighters began
to arrive in Pakistan. In parallel with China’s moves, Washington granted
Pakistan large-scale economic and military aid and gave guarantees of sup-
port for Pakistan in the event of Soviet incursions or worse.
To maintain plausible deniability for China and US support for the Afghan
resistance, it was necessary to supply those forces with Soviet-style weapons.
Once the Afghan operation was up and running, large quantities of such
weapons were required. China and the United States again cooperated. Secret
CIA missions traveled to the PRC to negotiate purchase of large quantities of
Soviet-style weapons: AK-47 rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and 122- and
144-millimeter rockets. Whole PLA munitions factories were dedicated to
producing the requisite Soviet-style weapons for Afghanistan. Of fifty million
US dollars initially appropriated (secretly) by the US Congress for CIA pur-
chase of arms for Afghanistan, $38 million was spent in China, which proved
to be a highly reliable supplier. Within a few years, US purchases averaged
US$ 100 million per year. By fall 1984, ships picked up weapons in Shanghai
for shipment to Karachi, where weapons were received and allocated by the
Pakistan army. The entire operation was top secret. Within the CIA, report-
edly no more than ten people were briefed on the program. Even years after
the Soviet withdrawal, China refused to acknowledge its involvement.^41
China also agreed to provide training for Afghan resistance fight-
ers. Initially, 300 Chinese military trainers operated at training camps in
Pakistan. Eventually, two additional camps were established in Xinjiang
outside Kashgar and Khotan.^42 Movement from Xinjiang into northeast
Afghanistan via the Karakorum Highway was quite convenient. PLA forces
deployed to Xinjiang to defend the camps from possible Soviet incursions.