424 { China’s Quest
that sentence: “Having in mind the foregoing statements” about the peace-
ful resolution of the Taiwan question. The 1982 communiqué was the third
document (after 1972 and 1978) in which the United States delivered to Beijing
small but significant concessions on Taiwan. It would not be the last.
In the US view, but not in the Chinese, the 1982 communiqué established
a clear if implicit linkage between US arms sales to Taiwan and the peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue. Beijing’s core objective as the talks entered
their final phase was to connect the termination of US arms sales to Taiwan
to the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
mutual non-interference in internal affairs. As Huang Hua acknowledged,
Beijing did not achieve this.^54 The statement in the August communiqué re-
garding mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity concludes
blandly with this sentence: “Both sides emphatically state that these princi-
ples continue to govern all aspects of their relations.” [Emphasis added.] From
Beijing’s perspective, “all” included arms sales to Taiwan. From Washington’s
perspective, it might or might not; the matter remained vague. Washington
refused to grant Beijing the right to regulate US relations with the people of
Ta iw a n.
Both Beijing and Washington used strategic triangular leverage in their
negotiating struggle. The leaders of the Reagan administration, especially
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, believed that PRC reliance on US power
to deter a Soviet attack and counter Soviet efforts to encircle China gave
Washington leverage over the PRC. Haig understood that the basis of
Sino-US rapprochement in 1972 had been Chinese fear of possible Soviet
attack and noted the increased stridency of Chinese warnings against Soviet
encirclement throughout the late 1970s. China needed US security support
and would therefore accede to US arms sales to Taiwan, Haig maintained.
He sought to persuade Beijing to accept US weapons sales to both the PRC
and Taiwan.
Beijing’s triangular leverage flipped the American argument: the United
States needed Chinese assistance to counter Soviet advances around the
world, and if Washington did not satisfy Beijing’s minimal demands regarding
arms sales to Taiwan, Washington might lose Chinese support in America’s
global contest with Moscow. In short, Washington needed Beijing more than
Beijing needed Washington. The difference in triangular approach was exem-
plified in mid-1980, when the United States proposed that US warships visit
Chinese ports in response to Soviet warships being stationed at Vietnam’s
ports. Ambassador Chai Zemin replied that certain aspects of US legislation
regarding Taiwan made such a proposal untimely.^55 Huang Hua intensified
the pressure in June 1981 by telling Haig that if the Taiwan arms sales issue
could not be solved, Sino-US relations might regress, bringing “serious con-
sequences to the strategic overall situation.” Haig countered by saying that
“the strategic overall situation is the big wheel, while the Taiwan question is