432 { China’s Quest
demands regarding Vietnam/Cambodia “hurt the interests of third parties,”
and Soviet policies toward Vietnam and Cambodia in no way constituted a
“threat” to China’s security, Soviet representatives insisted.
Renewed economic cooperation was not held hostage to deadlock on the
three obstacles. In December 1984, Soviet vice president Ivan Arkhipov, who
had headed the Soviet aid mission in China in the 1950s, visited China at the
invitation of CCP economic specialist Yao Yilin. During the long period of
poor Sino-Soviet relations, Arkhipov had not said anything bad about China,
Qian Qichen noted. Arkhipov also had many old friends in China with whom
he had worked in the 1950s—Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen—
and on whom he called during his 1984 stay. Arkhipov showed great inter-
est in China’s opening and reform, and visited Shenzhen among other places
in the company of Qian Qichen, who accompanied Arkhipov throughout
his visit. Three agreements on economic, scientific, and technological issues
were signed as a result of the visit, and a joint committee on cooperation in
these areas was established. In July of the next year, Yao Yilin reciprocated
Arkhipov’s visit. Moscow agreed to help build seven new factories.^7
In October 1985, following Mikhail Gorbachev’s selection as the top Soviet
leader the previous March, Deng upped the ante. During a visit by Romanian
communist leader Nicolai Ceausescu to Beijing, Deng told his visitor that if
China and the Soviet Union could reach agreement on the Soviets urging
Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, he was willing to receive Gorbachev
in Beijing. For the first time, Deng put on the table the possibility of a sum-
mit meeting with Gorbachev. Deng asked Ceausescu to convey the message
to Gorbachev.^8 According to Huang Hua, only during the second half of 1986,
as the USSR under Gorbachev began moving away from the Soviet Union’s
earlier “global offensive strategy” and “contention with the United States
for world hegemony,” did Moscow become willing to not only talk about
removing the three obstacles, but take action to do so.^9 Gradually, accord-
ing to Qian, Moscow accepted the proposition that a Vietnamese withdrawal
from Cambodia was an “important factor” in Sino-Soviet relations and that
both parties should do everything possible to encourage Vietnam to seek a
solution to the Cambodian issue.^10 Qian again underscored Cambodia as the
most important of the three obstacles.
In January 1988, Deng reiterated, via a MFA spokesman, that he was will-
ing to meet with Gorbachev, but only on the condition that Moscow per-
suade Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. Several days earlier, Gorbachev
had indicated in an interview with a Chinese magazine that he hoped for a
meeting with Deng. Now Deng indicated willingness for a summit meeting,
but also stated the price. “Without Soviet assistance, Vietnam could not fight
a single day in Kampuchea,” Deng said.^11 By September 1988, Moscow and
Beijing had reached an “internal understanding” (neibu liangjie) regarding
Vietnam and Cambodia. This seemed to open the door to a summit visit.