442 { China’s Quest
preemptive strike against Pakistan’s still embryonic nuclear arsenal (this was
following the 1981 Israeli strike on Osirak in Iraq), to be followed up by a
full-scale Indian invasion of Pakistan replicating New Delhi’s bold thrust of- In the event of a fourth round between India and Pakistan, a defensive
operation in the east against China (i.e., something that would have looked
a lot like Operation Chequerboard) would have made sense. We still do not
know the exact rationale behind the linked Indian exercises of Chequerboard
and Brasstacks. Some Indian scholars and former military leaders maintain
that India’s military leaders were, in fact, trying to maneuver the country
into a decisive blow against Pakistan. Beijing, for its part, feared that this was
India’s intention.
In December 1986, in the midst of the spiraling tension associated with
exercises Chequerboard and Brasstacks, the Indian government transformed
NEFA into the state of Arunachal Pradesh. This added further fuel to the
fire. In Beijing, an MFA spokesman declared that this move was absolutely
illegal and China would never recognize the “so-called state.” Two months
later, when India formalized the change, Beijing expressed “indignation” at
India’s action, which “grossly violated China’s sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity and hurt the national feelings of the Chinese people.”^30 From Beijing’s
perspective, New Delhi’s actions were ever more reckless and brazen.
By spring 1987, as snow melted and passes reopened, the confrontation
peaked. The PLA reportedly deployed 22,000 troops, along with high-altitude
helicopters and jet fighters and bombers, to Tibet in response to escalating
tension at Sumdorong Chu. Beijing lobbied both Washington and Moscow to
rein in India. In October 1986, US Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger
carried a message from Deng Xiaoping to Indian leaders: If India did not stop
“nibbling” at Indian territory, China would have to teach it a lesson. The next
March, Secretary of State Shultz delivered a second, similar warning. In talks
with Soviet leaders, too, Beijing made it clear that Sino-Soviet normalization
would not advance if Moscow supported India against China. Gorbachev vis-
ited India in November 1986 to reassure India that recent improvements in
Sino-Soviet relations would not lead to weakening of Soviet support for India.
Noticeably, however, Gorbachev refused to take India’s side in the confron-
tation at Sumdorong Chu. The Soviet leader professed ignorance of the situ-
ation on the border and called for better relations between the Soviet Union,
India, and China “so no one will have to choose sides.”^31 In essence, Moscow
disengaged from its alliance with India to help open the door to rapproche-
ment with Beijing.
In this context of escalating military confrontation and possible
India-Pakistan-China war, in March 1987 Qiao Shi, a Politburo Standing
Committee member with background in national security and intelligence,
visited Burma, Nepal, and Bangladesh to discuss “international issues of
mutual concern.” One of Qiao’s objectives was to minimize support of those