Normalization with the Asian Powers } 443
countries for India in the event of a border clash. In talks with Bangladeshi
President Hussain Muhammad Ershad, Qiao reportedly asked Bangladesh not
to permit movement of Indian men or materiel across Bangladeshi territory
in the event of a Sino-Indian clash.^32 Passage through Bangladeshi territory
could well be critical for India. India’s only territorial link with its northeastern
states was (and remains) via an approximately twenty-five-kilometer-wide
strip of territory in the vicinity of the West Bengal town of Siliguri (the Siliguri
Corridor). That town itself lies only about seventy-five miles from the south-
ern tip of China’s Chumbi Valley salient with its strong PLA presence. This
meant that in the event of a Sino-Indian clash, Chinese forces might easily
cut the Siliguri Corridor, leaving India with no legal way to reinforce forces
defending its northeastern states. Indian forces could, of course, force their
way across Bangladeshi territory, but that would carry the political onus of
violating the neutrality of a nonbelligerent country—a serious offense under
international law. A month after Qiao Shi’s visit to Dacca, President Ershad
visited Beijing. Media reports indicated that he agreed to Beijing’s request. As
is often the case in South Asia, China was able to benefit from the deep suspi-
cions of India among its neighbors.
Beijing’s hardball tactics with India in the border negotiations and at
Sumdorong Chu apparently worked. In late 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi undertook a reevaluation of India’s approach to China and the costs
of a possible conflict. The young Indian leader decided that a number of shifts
in India’s China policy were necessary. The level of dialogue was upgraded.
Gandhi sent Defense Minister K. C. Pant to Beijing in April to convey a desire
to avoid conflict. India’s foreign minister followed two months later. Gandhi
also ordered a pullback of Indian forces from the border. Most significant of
all, Gandhi decided to accept the delinkage approach suggested by Huang
Hua in 1981. Sino-Indian ties would advance in areas where agreement could
be reached, and would no longer be held hostage to the intractable territorial
issue or Sino-Pakistan military ties. To symbolize and implement this new
Indian approach, Gandhi decided to visit China for a summit meeting with
Deng Xiaoping. This was the first visit by an Indian prime minister to China
since a 1954 visit by Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajiv Gandhi’s grandfather.
Rajiv Gandhi’s December 1988 summit with Deng ranks with Nixon’s
1972 and Gorbachev’s 1989 visits as a reorientation of policy symbolized by
a summit. Deng Xiaoping (then eighty-four years old) had a ninety-minute
talk with Gandhi (then forty-four). The crux of Deng’s appeal to the young
Indian leader was that the two countries were both developing countries,
with many common interests. It followed, Deng told Gandhi, that the two
countries should work together to create a new international economic order
in greater comport with the interests of the Third World developing counties
and less in service of the rich Western developed countries. The two countries
should also strive to create a new international political order lessening the