Normalization with the Asian Powers } 445
by its communist regime. In 1979, at the very beginning of Deng’s rule, that
image of repression by militant atheism was not necessarily inaccurate. The
PRC was viewed by IRI leaders as an infidel “arrogant power” on a par with
the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, or Israel. China’s relation with
Iran had abruptly been transformed from close anti-hegemony partnership
to cold hostility.^34
It did not matter greatly to China’s leaders whether Iran’s rulers were “feu-
dal” monarchs or Islamic revolutionaries. Beijing sought to promote Chinese
interests via cooperation with whatever government ruled in Tehran. Thus,
three days after the IRI was established, Premier Hua Guofeng sent a message
recognizing the provisional government and congratulating its new prime
minister. The PRC ambassador in Tehran also stayed at his post and managed
to call on the IRI’s new prime minister—who, unfortunately for Beijing, would
be thrown out of office by Khomeini after several months. Beijing also drafted a
letter of apology signed by Hua Guofeng and addressed to the Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khomeini. In the letter, Hua apologized for his visit of the previous
year, and explained it as a function of airplane refueling ranges, diplomatic
politeness, and the like, rather than as representing some deep political pur-
pose. Khomeini merely acknowledged receipt of the letter.
Beijing’s efforts to rebuild ties with Iran in the first eighteen months of the
revolution were greatly hindered by the fact that China’s efforts at rapproche-
ment were targeted toward a group of IRI leaders that ultimately constituted
the losing side of a struggle for power within the revolutionary camp. A real-
ist faction believed that the IRI should use diplomatic maneuver among the
powers to advance Iran’s interests. The IRI prime minister, foreign minister,
and later the president who solicited, received, and welcomed early Chinese
diplomatic moves were members of this realist camp. But an idealist fac-
tion put Islamic values above pursuit of national interests, and believed that
association with arrogant and satanic powers would lead the revolution off
course. Gradually, the realists were pushed aside by the idealists, fully backed
by Khomeini. One of the consequences of this for Beijing was that repeated
Chinese initiatives simply did not gain traction in Tehran.
In February 1980, Beijing played its Muslim card when Chinese Hui leader
Al-hajji Mohammad Ali Zhang Jie led a delegation of Chinese Muslims to
the IRI—the first such delegation. Hui are Han Chinese of the Islamic faith,
a religion that entered China in the Middle Ages. Zhang Jie, to use his sim-
ple Chinese name, was a longtime leader of CCP united front work among
Muslims. In the 1930s, he had headed the mosque in the Yan’an capital of
the CCP base area. He then led anti-Japanese united front work for the CCP
among China’s Muslim communities. After the establishment of the PRC,
he became a key figure in PRC cultural diplomacy toward majority Muslim
countries. By 1980, he had already led ten Chinese Muslim delegations to for-
eign countries. Zhang Jie’s chief purpose in visiting Tehran was to explain to