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be told that such help was inconsistent with IRI criticism of Soviet activities
in Afghanistan. IRI representatives then sought Chinese assistance, and the
two countries worked together to make the draft resolution more “fair and
balanced” in Tehran’s view. Once Tehran and Baghdad accepted on August 8,
1987, Resolution Number 598 (endorsed by the Security Council on July 20),
very difficult negotiations between Tehran and Baghdad began in Geneva.
During these talks, too, Tehran turned frequently to Beijing for assistance.^38
Beijing thus made itself useful to Tehran in several ways.
Beijing also condemned US military actions in the Gulf punishing Iran
for what Washington deemed illegal Iranian attacks on neutral commerce
in international waters. As conflict between the US navy and the IRI navy
and Revolutionary Guards escalated in mid-1987 (a conflict commonly re-
ferred to as the “tanker war”), Beijing insisted that military action by any
of the Permanent Five in the Gulf required the consent of all the Permanent
Five. After a US-flagged and -escorted Kuwaiti ship struck an Iranian mine
in international waters and the United States took punitive military action
against Iran, China’s MFA condemned big-power interference in the Gulf
and insisted that the security affairs of the Gulf should be handled by the
countries of the region, i.e., the littoral principle tracing back to Ji Pengfei’s
1973 visit to Tehran. Xinhua condemned US military action against Iran as
big-power moves aggravating tension and creating a more explosive situa-
tion. Tehran had a few other friends who might speak up on its behalf—Libya,
Syria, and North Korea. But none of these spoke with the authority or capa-
bilities of the PRC.
As IRI leaders began to look on China as a like-minded and capable
partner, Beijing had to lay down some limits on how far it was willing to
go. Tehran in the mid-1980s developed a plan to expel Israel from the UN
General Assembly as the first step toward destruction of the “Zionist entity.”
Tehran also urged Beijing to oppose the 1978 US-brokered Camp David treaty
between Egypt and Israel on the grounds that it trampled on the rights of the
Palestinian people. Chinese representatives listed politely to these proposals,
and declined to go along. IRI media was also critical of China’s warm rela-
tions with the United States. When President Ronald Reagan visited China in
1984, IRI media was strongly critical of the visit. Chinese envoys instructed
Tehran regarding Chinese views of how the new PRC-IRI relation should
work. Washington should not tell Tehran and Beijing what kind of relation
they should have, Beijing would not tell Tehran what type of relation with
the United States it should have, and Tehran should not tell Washington and
Beijing what their relation should be. Each country would determine its for-
eign policies for itself, Beijing suggested. Gradually Iranian leaders came to
understand some of the stark realities governing China’s ties with the United
States: China did not want to spoil its relation with the United States (or with
Israel, Iraq, or any other country, for that matter) on Iran’s behalf.