Normalization with the Asian Powers } 457
sincerely and solve the question well.”^53 Eight months later Japan extended a
new loan of 69 billion yen. There was not a direct linkage between Chinese
ire over the history issue and Japanese development assistance to China. On
the other hand, Japanese assistance was clearly intended as a demonstration
of Japanese friendship for China.
Three years later, the fortieth anniversary, on August 15, 1985, precipi-
tated another flood of articles and special events portraying the horrors of
Japan’s history. A summer-long television program depicted the horrors of
the Japanese invasion and occupation. A new museum opened in Nanjing
commemorating the 1937 massacre in that city. New publications detailing
the Nanjing Massacre appeared. One booklet selected the most gruesome
photos from the museum collection: rows of severed heads, mutilated bod-
ies of women and children, mass graves, and so on. Thirty-four thousand
copies were printed. Other media outlets rebutted the Japanese media’s focus
on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These were attempts to
win sympathy for Japan and allow Japan to avoid feelings of guilt for Japan’s
crimes in China, China’s media charged.
A visit by Prime Minister Nakasone to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on
August 15, 1985, added fuel to the fire of China’s anger. The Yasukuni Shinto
shrine in central Tokyo was established in 1869 to commemorate and pray
for all Japanese soldiers who had died in that country’s wars since the Meiji
Restoration.^54 Japan’s government ceased financial support and involvement
with Yasukuni in 1972, but the shrine continued to be controversial, partly
because it contained the name plaques of fourteen Class A war criminals as
determined by the post–World War II Far Eastern War Crime Trials. The
museum associated with the shrine views Japan’s World War II more or less
as the wartime commanders of that war did: as a noble effort to liberate the
colored peoples of Asia from domination by the white Western powers. Prior
to 1985, other Japanese prime ministers had visited Yasukuni on August 15,
but only in a nonofficial capacity. Nakasone broke with that precedent and
visited in his official capacity as prime minister. China had learned of the up-
coming visit before it occurred and asked Tokyo to handle it with prudence.
When an official visit nonetheless transpired, the MFA declared that it had
hurt the feelings of the Chinese people. The MFA did not, however, issue a
formal protest, perhaps because of fear of the popular Chinese response.
The textbook issue returned in February 1986, when a tendentious text-
book intended to make “young people love their country’s history” came
before a review commission in Tokyo. Beijing interpreted it as a violation of
Suzuki’s 1982 promise to correct the errors in Japanese textbooks. Instead,
said the MFA, Japan’s Ministry of Education had again “done something
that hurts the feelings of the Chinese people.”^55 The MFA then issued a “stern
note” asserting that the proposed text book “grossly distorts history” and
stating that “the Chinese government strongly demands that the Japanese