1989: The CCP’s Near Escape } 467
On May 17, the Politburo Standing Committee split over the question of
declaring martial law to end the escalating student-led protest movement. Li
Peng and vice premier Yao Yilin were in favor of martial law, Zhao Ziyang
and Hu Qili were opposed. Qiao Shi, the fifth Standing Committee member,
abstained. The matter was then referred to Deng, who settled the issue: mar-
tial law would be imposed in the urban districts of Beijing. The situation
had gone so far, however, that when martial law was publicly declared on
May 20 and convoys of troops attempted to enter the city, their advance was
blocked by huge throngs of ordinary Beijing citizens. What had begun as a
student movement had become a movement of the populace of Beijing. After
a standoff lasting over a day, the troops withdrew. CCP leaders then mobi-
lized troops from every Military Region and deployed them to Beijing. When
those new forces entered the city on the night of June 3–4, they were autho-
rized to use all necessary force. When crowds of Beijingers again blocked the
military’s advance, troops fired tear gas and rubber bullets. When that failed
to disburse the crowds, around 10:30 p.m. troops began firing directly into
the crowds. Enraged citizens continued to oppose them with rocks, Molotov
cocktails, and angry taunts. Confrontations resulting in much bloodshed
continued throughout the night and into the next morning.
Two weeks later, Beijing party secretary Li Ximing reported to the
Politburo that 241 people died in the fighting on June 3–4 (known as “6-4”).
The International Red Cross put the number at 2,800 killed and an equal
number wounded. Another 15,000 to 20,000 people were arrested in the days
after “6-4,” and between 50 and 100 of these were executed (mostly for violent
acts). Thousands were jailed for long terms.
As the protest movement grew in April and May, Politburo hardliners had
concluded that hostile foreign forces were behind the growing challenge to
party authority. On April 28, Premier Li Peng told the Politburo that the “tur-
moil” was “the result of long-term preparation by a tiny minority of bour-
geois liberal elements hooked up with anti-China forces outside the country.”
“For this reason, we must fully realize the complex and protracted nature of
this political struggle,” Li told the PBSC.^3 “Every day,” Li said, “foreigners of
unclear status” came and went on Beijing college campuses to “plot strategy”
with “the leaders of the illegal student organizations.” At the same meeting
of the PBSC, elder Bo Yibo, who served as Deng Xiaoping’s representative
on the Standing Committee, concurred with Li Peng’s targeting of “foreign
anti-China forces.” Foreigners, such as the influential newsweekly Far Eastern
Economic Review, Bo said, were “trumpeting” that China’s reforms were “a
dead end .... Because they want to encourage the students and to throw our
Party and our national spirit into confusion.”^4 The Ministry of State Security
(MSS) supplied top CCP leaders with regular summaries of foreign media
coverage of China’s student movement. Unsurprisingly, most of that coverage
sympathized with the students. Much of the foreign media saw the movement