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away at economic development, reform, and opening. Deng also made clear
in his June 6 talk to the Politburo meeting that an indispensable condition
for China’s economic development was a peaceful international environment.
Implicit in this was that China should avoid confrontation with the United
States if at all possible. Nor would it close its doors out of a fear of peaceful
evolution:
We won’t close any doors; our biggest lesson from the past has been
not to isolate ourself from the world—that only puts us out of touch
and into a big sleep. If history confirms the superiority of the Chinese
socialist system, that’s enough for us. What happens with the social sys-
tems of other countries is none of our business.^27
It was fortuitous that Deng had in President George H. W. Bush a leader
passionately committed to a cooperative relation between China and the
United States, and also an old personal friend of Deng. Bush had represented
the United States in the United Nations during the September 1971 debate
over Chinese representation. He had then opened and headed the US Liaison
Office in Beijing in 1973–1974. This was during Deng’s first rehabilitation after
the Cultural Revolution. Deng and Bush had met during those years, saw in
each other a potential future national leader, and mutually cultivated their
friendship. Later, as Ronald Reagan’s vice president from 1981 to 1988, Bush
had helped smooth out the confrontation over US arms sales to Taiwan.
Going even further back, Bush had served as a combat pilot with the US
navy in the Pacific in World War II. These experiences had given Bush sym-
pathy with the Chinese people and a belief that cooperation between China
and the United States was in the interests of both countries and the world.
During his 1979 visit to the United States—while Democrat Jimmy Carter
was president and Bush was out of office—Deng nonetheless requested and
was granted a private meeting with Bush in Houston, Texas. During that
meeting, Deng gave Bush a frank tour d’horizon of China’s foreign poli-
cies, including the then still secret plan to attack Vietnam. Later, when Bush
visited Beijing as president in February 1989 prior to Gorbachev’s scheduled
visit and the Sino-Soviet rapprochement that that visit was expected to pro-
duce, Deng again gave Bush a frank review of Sino-Soviet relations. Over the
years, Bush had also sent occasional notes to Deng in an effort to maintain
their friendship. Deng did not reply to those notes, but valued Bush’s effort
to maintain their friendship.^28
Yet as Deng told Bush’s National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft during
the latter’s December 1989 mission to Beijing, a question such as then existed
between China and the United States—interference in China’s internal affairs
and sanctions—could not be settled on the basis of friendship between two
individuals. That said, the two leaders, Deng and Bush, nonetheless worked in
tandem during 1989 to normalize relations after 6-4. In doing so, Bush acted