Diplomacy of Damage Control } 501
had misled the naive and inexperienced students. The invitation of Fang
and his wife to a banquet at the US embassy during President Bush’s visit
to Beijing in February 1989 was seen by CCP conservatives as a deliberate
attempt to humiliate China. In that event, the US side had rejected China’s
request to uninvite Fang and his wife, but their attendance was prevented by
their detention (along with two American academics accompanying them)
by public security the evening of the banquet. Once Fang fled to the US
embassy, Chinese authorities issued an arrest warrant for him for “instigating
the recent turmoil.” Chinese publications began demanding that the United
States turn him over to Chinese police or face deterioration of Sino-US ties.
Chinese police respected the inviolability of the US diplomatic compound,
but for over a year Fang was not allowed to leave for exile in the United States,
as US representatives suggested. Chinese anger over “US interference in
China’s internal affairs” was real, but that anger was probably not the main
reason for Fang’s continued immobilization. Keeping Fang locked in the US
embassy provided leverage with Washington.
After six months of deadlock over Fang, Deng proposed to Henry Kissinger
a “package deal” that would make Fang’s release more palatable by making
it a quid pro quo for considerable US concessions to China. Beijing would
allow Fang and his wife to leave for the United States, while the United States
would then make an explicit announcement that it would lift sanctions on
China. The two sides would also agree on one or two big economic proj-
ects. Finally, Jiang Zemin would make an official visit the United States.^32
Following a second visit by Scowcroft in December, Bush began lifting sanc-
tions.^33 Beijing reciprocated by announcing the end of martial law in Beijing
and releasing 573 people detained after 6-4. In May 1990, Bush announced
that he would extend China’s most favored nation status. The next month,
over a year after they had entered the US embassy, the Fangs were allowed
to leave China.
Qian Qichen took the opportunity of Scowcroft’s second, December 1989,
visit to engineer a public display of the US envoy honoring—perhaps kowtow-
ing to is a better term—China’s top leaders.^34 Scowcroft had been concerned
that photographs of his toast to China’s leaders during the formal banquet
would become the target of criticism in the United States. He had thus
insisted, and the Chinese side had agreed, that reporters would be granted a
photo opportunity only before the banquet, but not during the banquet itself.
This protocol was followed until Scowcroft began his toast during the ban-
quet, at which point reporters and photographers were allowed into the hall
and went to work. Rather than stop the toast and probably thereby scuttle the
negotiations, Scowcroft continued with his toast, demonstrating for the whole
world that US representatives respected those of China. In effect, Qian used
Scowcroft’s desire for successful negotiations to force him to make public a
ritual he had preferred to keep private. Scowcroft refused, however, to accept