Diplomacy of Damage Control } 503
an irrevocable part of Iraq. Most countries of the region quickly concluded
that Saddam Hussein could not be persuaded to evacuate Kuwait by negotia-
tions or even economic sanctions, and that military force would be necessary
if Kuwaiti sovereignty was to be re-established. China was not prepared to
endorse use of military force against Iraq, and this made China essentially
irrelevant to the restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty. But Beijing was prepared
to trade a green light in the Security Council for authorization of use of mili-
tary force in exchange for US lifting of sanctions.
China voted “yes” on the first nine UN Security Council resolutions in
fall 1990 condemning Iraq’s action and imposing mandatory sanctions on
Iraq. Voting for sanctions “was not an easy thing,” Qian recounted, since the
United States, France, and Britain still maintained sanctions against China
for 6-4.^38 Beijing decided that a display of diplomatic involvement in the cri-
sis would increase China’s influence and status in the region over the long
term, and dispatched Qian on visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq
in mid-November. The explicit ostensible purpose of Qian’s trip was to seek
a “peaceful resolution” of Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait, but the real if implicit
purpose was to increase the US perception of the need for China’s support in
dealing with the crisis. And indeed, while Qian was in Cairo, US Secretary
of State James Baker, who was also in that city, contacted Qian, asked for a
meeting, and then solicited China’s support for Security Council authoriza-
tion of the use of force to liberate Kuwait. After Baker laid out the US view
that sanctions would not work and that military force would be required to
get Iraq out of Kuwait, Qian argued that sanctions should be given a longer
trial, although he declined to specify how long that trial period might be. In
this way, Qian made clear to the United States that there would be a price if
it wanted China’s cooperation in securing Security Council endorsement of
the use of military force against Iraq. Baker said that if Beijing cooperated at
the UN, the United States was prepared to find an opportunity to end sanc-
tions against China.
It was clear to Qian and Baker that both sides were interested in mak-
ing a deal. Discussion then focused on the price Washington would pay to
secure Beijing’s cooperation in the Security Council. In a letter to Qian, Baker
proposed Chinese “approval” to a use-of-force resolution. Qian saw this as
an attempt to raise “the price already agreed on,” and insisted that China
would not vote “yes” but merely abstain on the critical Security Council
vote. For the US part, Baker agreed that Washington would “find an oppor-
tunity” to lift sanctions on China, including not opposing a new and large
World Bank loan to China. Qian also claims that the United States agreed to
support China’s entry into GATT under terms regarding Taiwan that were
acceptable to China, and to lift the ban on satellite sales to China. Qian points
out that Baker’s November 1990 visit to Beijing—the first by a US cabinet
official since 6-4—represented resumption of high-level US exchanges with