514 { China’s Quest
In practice, however, such an approach would create problems—just as it once
had in Southeast Asia. These difficulties might give Taiwan opportunities to
expand its links with postcommunist East Europe. Even more egregious,
standing vociferously against Gorbachev and his “reforms” would run coun-
ter to PRC efforts to escape the opprobrium incurred by the Beijing Massacre.
And what was to be gained by polemics against Gorbachev? The costs of
openly polemicizing against Gorbachev were clear. The gains from such an
approach were not. Thus Deng, against apparently strong opposition, man-
dated a policy of “distinguishing between internal and external affairs” (nei
wai you bie). Within the CCP, there would be an intense educational cam-
paign against Gorbachev’s errors and ideological mistakes. This would coun-
ter the wavering that had occurred among some party members during the
spring upheaval, and would unite the party for future struggle against “peace-
ful evolution.” But externally, outside the party, and even more internation-
ally, China would not engage in ideological struggle against Gorbachev’s
apostasy. Externally, China would follow a policy of noninterference in the
internal affairs of other countries and avoid direct normative judgments on
those affairs. The critical factor, Deng said, was the ideological strength and
unity within the Chinese Communist Party. If party members understood
Gorbachev’s betrayal of the Four Cardinal Principles and the consequences
thereof, that was sufficient. China would attend to its own affairs and let other
nations attend to their affairs.
The problem with open polemical struggle against Gorbachev’s “betrayal
of the East European proletariat,” of course, was that such a course would not
serve China’s, or even the CCP’s, interests. It was in this context that Deng
Xiaoping issued what was to become one of his most famous foreign pol-
icy dictums, his “twenty-four character directive.” Translated into English,
it read:
Observe the situation calmly; stand firm in our position; deal with mat-
ters calmly; hide our capabilities and bide our time to make a come-
back; maintain a low profile; never seek leadership.
The twenty-four character directive was to guide foreign affairs. Internally,
the CCP took a far less equanimous approach. Within China, in universi-
ties, government organs, and especially within the party, an intense struggle
was to be waged against the treacherous “New Thinking” of Gorbachev’s lib-
eral communism. No quarter would be given to those ideas; all their dangers
would be exposed systematically and thoroughly by an ideological rectifi-
cation and re-education campaign. This campaign would make sure people
were clear about the “complex international background” of the contempo-
rary challenges to proletarian power, i.e., the instigation and support of “hos-
tile Western powers led by the United States” with the objective of destroying
socialism and achieving world hegemony. Internally, the party would adopt a