542 { China’s Quest
Taiwan was a major obstacle in development of a new Russo-Chinese rela-
tion. As liberalization advanced in both Taiwan and the Soviet Union in the
late 1980s, people in both countries became interested in expanding ties. For
a period of several years, there was something of a Taiwan-Russia “fever” in
both countries. In May 1988, an influential Taiwan business lobbying group
visited Moscow to explore possibilities. There was strong interest from the
Soviet side. Beijing responded very harshly and demanded an explanation
from Moscow. The Soviet Union backed away from Taiwan, and during his
May 1989 Beijing visit Gorbachev re-endorsed visit Moscow’s traditional
position of support for China’s Taiwan claim.^33 Yet Russia-Taiwan continued
to intensify as central controls in both countries weakened. Both countries’
transition to democracy was accelerating, and there was great enthusiasm
in both for getting to know the other. During 1990, a number of Russian
groups maneuvered to monopolize the growing ties with Taiwan. One in-
fluential group was packed with former CPSU Central Committee members
and headed by foreign minister Edward Shevardnadze. Some Soviet visitors
to Taiwan spoke publicly of large-scale arms sales, representative offices, or
even full diplomatic ties.
Beijing was deeply troubled by these flourishing Soviet-Taiwan ties.
During Jiang Zemin’s May 1991 visit to Moscow, Soviet leaders proposed
that Beijing agree to Moscow establishing a nonofficial representative office
in Taiwan along the lines of that maintained by the United States. Beijing
strongly objected, insisting, inter alia, that the United States was an old ally
of Taiwan while the Soviet Union was not, and that the United States was
winding down its ties to Taiwan, while the Soviet Union was expanding
them. Confronted with Beijing’s opposition, Moscow dropped its proposal. In
the December 1991 renormalization joint statement, Moscow pledged again to
“respect and support” Beijing’s position on Taiwan. Negotiations over Taiwan
continued into 1992. Beijing eventually agreed that nongovernmental offices
could be mutually established in Moscow and Taipei, and in September 1992
Yeltsin did this for Russia by executive order. The same order abolished an
earlier, and “official,” liaison office. This agreement over Taiwan opened the
way for a December 1992 visit by Yeltsin to Beijing. The joint statement result-
ing from that visited stipulated Russia’s “recognition” that Taiwan was “an
integral part of Chinese territory” and pledged to maintain only nongovern-
mental relations with Taiwan.^34 As the Russo-Chinese entente developed in
the mid-1990s, Russian enthusiasm for expanded ties with Taiwan cooled.
Yeltsin’s December 1992 visit to Beijing began the process of building a
new strategic partnership. The joint communiqué signed by Jiang Zemin
and Yeltsin during that visit provided that China and Russia were “friendly
countries,” that “neither party would join a “military or political alliance”
against the other, “sign any treaty or agreement with a third country preju-
dicing the sovereignty and security interests of the other party, or allow its