554 { China’s Quest
of carrying chemical-weapon precursors to Iran. Both events dovetailed
nicely with the narrative of China’s national humiliation propounded with
added vigor by the CCP propaganda apparatus after 6-4. And these events,
both in 1993, tapped sentiments of resentment of many people in China, giv-
ing real traction for the first time to CCP nationalist indoctrination efforts.
For the first four years after the Beijing Massacre, CCP efforts at both inten-
sified patriotic education and Marxist-Leninist-rooted anti–peaceful evolu-
tion propaganda produced modest results in rallying support for the regime.
Sullen anger over the bloody repression of June 1989, combined with fear
that the party was turning away from the popular policies of opening and
reform, created a sullen atmosphere in which the diligent efforts of propa-
ganda yielded little result. By 1994, however, the environment had changed.
CCP propaganda about Western humiliation of China resonated with a much
larger part of Chinese public opinion. By 1994–1995, some of China’s intel-
lectuals were spontaneously and autonomously producing a new anti-US na-
tionalist literature. The two random events of 1993 were significant factors
accomplishing this shift.
Regarding the Olympics, in 1990 Beijing Party Secretary Chen Xitong
launched an application to the International Olympics Committee (IOC) for
that city to host the 2000 Olympic Games. Such sponsorship would, CCP
leaders calculated, help wipe out memories of the Beijing Massacre and pro-
vide the CCP will a much-needed boost in popularity. Tokyo’s hosting of the
1964 Olympics and South Korea’s hosting of the 1988 Olympics (the first and
second times the Olympic Games were held in Asia) were recognized as major
landmarks in the global rehabilitation of those countries from the ashes of
war. The CCP hoped that the 2000 games would do something similarly pos-
itive for the PRC and the CCP. But Beijing city leaders were not well informed
about the IOC decision process or about realistic chances for Beijing being
awarded the Games so soon after the Beijing Massacre.
Once Beijing had applied with the IOC, China’s government launched
a three-year campaign, with rallies, billboards, and media propaganda.
Beijing’s lobbying campaign with the IOC was reportedly the most active
and best-funded of all competitors for the 2000 games. The size of Beijing’s
proposed Olympics budget dwarfed competitors.^48 When an IOC inspec-
tion committee visited Beijing, large numbers of street-sweepers cleaned up
the city, smog-producing factories were shut down, and throngs of cheering
school children lined the streets for the IOC group. In an appeal to Third
World members of the IOC, Beijing promised that it would use most of the
$120 million profit estimated to result from the Games to support athletics
in developing countries. Beijing also promised that, if Beijing got the 2000
Games, the names of IOC members and winners would be inscribed into
the Great Wall. For ordinary Chinese, the prospect of Beijing hosting the
2000 Olympics drew considerable interest and support. By the time the IOC