562 { China’s Quest
China with soft loans.^12 But these were narrow interests. In broader terms,
it really didn’t matter to Beijing whether Kuwait’s oil was controlled from
Kuwait City or from Baghdad. Both were Third World developing countries
with friendly relations with China. If, however, Kuwait’s oil was controlled by
Washington, and if Washington was able to use that control to keep Japan,
Western Europe, or China itself in line, China’s geostrategic interests would
be injured. Yet precisely because of the centrality of the Persian Gulf in US
global hegemonist strategy—as perceived by Beijing—if the PRC tried to
thwart US moves, the consequences for PRC-US relations could be dire.
From Beijing’s perspective, Washington was seizing on Iraq’s unfortunate
annexation of Kuwait to advance US control over Persian Gulf oil as a step
toward achievement of a New Global Order of American global dominance.
The United States, now freed of countering moves by the USSR, was focusing
on the Persian Gulf and its oil in a new drive for global domination. But if
the Persian Gulf was the epicenter of the current US drive for global dom-
ination, for China to oppose or thwart Washington in that region could be
extremely dangerous. The more prudent course, one that characterized ac-
tual Chinese policy, was to demand and take the highest price possible that
Washington was willing to pay for China’s nonopposition to US moves, even
while quietly laying snares for the United States when opportunities arose.
Underlying Chinese policy was a conviction that US hegemonist strategy
would ultimately fail. Superpower attempts to dominate the Third World
would meet with the resistance of the people of the developing countries,
and ultimately would be defeated. Until then, Beijing would get what it could
from the United States for “allowing” the United States to run amuck in the
Gulf and toward what was certain to be ultimate failure there. Until that day,
China’s policy of nonopposition to US moves in the Gulf would allow the
energy resources China needed from that oil-rich region to continue flowing
to China.
A State Council–Central Committee document of January 1991, as the
US-led military assault to restore Kuwait loomed, stipulated that China would
not openly criticize the United States or other coalition members during the
early stage of the upcoming conflict. Chinese propaganda would maintain
a neutral stance during this period. Once the battlefield situation became
protracted and began to shift against the United States, China’s propaganda
and diplomacy would shift, and it would do what it could to contribute to
the failure of the US hegemonist scheme to control Persian Gulf oil. In line
with the January directive, Chinese media coverage of US moves during the
1990–1991 crises was relatively objective. Yet the assessment of US motives
was overwhelmingly critical. US motives were selfish considerations of power
and control. The tone, however, was not vitriolic. The war apparently never
reached the second state anticipated by the State Council–CC document of
January 1991.