China and America in the Persian Gulf } 571
calculations, there were more amorphous considerations of national reputa-
tion. To the extent that the international community (the Western countries,
the Arab countries, Israel) sided with US demands on Iran, China’s refusal to
go along with those demands could tar China as an uncooperative and irre-
sponsible or even “rogue” state.
On the other hand, if the United States succeeded, perhaps with indi-
rect Chinese help, in pressuring Iran into submission, this would increase
China’s vulnerability to a potential US energy embargo. Most of the oil-
rich countries of the Persian Gulf—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and the
UAE—were already aligned with the United States and unlikely to stand
with China against it in such an extreme situation. The IRI, alone among
the Persian Gulf countries, would probably be able and willing to tell the
Americans to go to hell and do what it could to assist a Chinese defeat of a
US oil embargo. Perhaps even more important, Chinese capitulation to US
demands regarding the IRI would undermine China’s effort to gradually,
over time, build with Iran an all-weather partnership based on trust and
Date U.S. Policy Initiative China’s Policy Choice
1979–80 Punish Iranian seizure and detention
of U.S. diplomatic personnel
condemns IRI violation of diplomatic
Immunity & U.S. resort to force to free
1982–88 Push for UN-sponsored arms embargo
against Iran to push it to end war with Iraq
Rejected; served as Iran’s major arms
supplier
1982–97 Push to end anti-ship cruise missile
sales to Iran
Seemingly accepted U.S. demands but
found ways to transfer to Iran
1987–88 Multilateral action to safeguard neutral
oil traffic during “tanker war”
Rejected; remained disassociated from
action
1990 Resort to UN-sponsored war to undo
Iraqi annexation of Kuwait
Rejected and opposed, but obstained
on Security Council vote
19 9 7–2 0 02 Use of air attack to uphold sanction and
inspection regime re Iraq
Opposed
1995–2002 Maintenance of tough sanction regime
against Iraq
Opposed, but let others take lead in
opposition
1996–2007 Effort block large foreign investment in
Iran energy sector
Rejected, but let other powers take the
lead in opposing
1983–1997 End foreign assistance to Iran nuclear
programs
Rejected for 13 years; agreed 1997
1989–2007 End sale of dual-use ballistic missile tech
technology to Iran
Rejected, except for Category I
1989–1997 End sale of Category I related ballistic
missile items
Nominally accepted; substantially
accepted, 1997
2003 War for regime change in Iraq Opposed, but let other powers take
lead in countering
2004–07 Democratization and reform of middle
East
Rejected and opposed
2006–2013 Push for sanctions against Iran over
nuclear programs
Agreed to, but worked to weaken and
delay
FIGURE 21-1 Beijing’s Choices in Managing Its Persian Gulf Dilemma