The Recovery of Hong Kong } 591
investment continued to flood in. A constant pulling and tugging between
Beijing and London continued over British administration of Hong Kong
throughout 1985–1988, but those disagreements paled compared to the con-
frontation that erupted following the Beijing Massacre.
Britain’s “Public Opinion Card” versus CCP United Front Work
CCP strategy for dealing with Britain was a combination of struggle and co-
operation. According to Xu Jiatun, head of Xinhua’s Hong Kong office and
China’s top official in Hong Kong, Beijing saw negotiations as a battlefield
where British cooperation would be secured for the return of the territory
to complete Chinese administration while maintaining Hong Kong’s pros-
perity. Britain very much wanted to continue a direct administrative role, or
failing that, to have continuing influence in Hong Kong after 1997, at least in
Xu Jiatun’s view of British aims. British efforts to achieve such infringements
on China’s sovereignty were to be defeated via struggle in diplomatic negotia-
tions; Britain would be compelled to cooperate with China on China’s terms
and without destabilizing Hong Kong’s prosperous economy. Britain repeat-
edly threatened that Hong Kong’s economic prosperity would falter if China
did not go along with London’s proposals. But as in Deng’s negotiations with
Thatcher, China would meet British toughness with Chinese toughness. If
China was prepared to walk away from negotiations, London would prob-
ably ultimately accede to China’s terms for the sake of a face-saving exit from
Hong Kong and future British business opportunities in China. If Britain
refused to accept China’s terms (which ultimately turned out to be the case),
China would handle the matter unilaterally, confident that the CCP’s emi-
nently reasonable “one country, two systems” framework, combined with as-
siduous united front work in Hong Kong, would manage reversion without
precipitating capital flight and collapse of the economy. Again, all this in Xu
Jiat u n’s v iew.^28
Subtly encased in Chinese diplomacy was the hinted threat of unilateral
action, including use of military force against Britain, if things began to go
wrong in Hong Kong before July 1, 1997. During their September 1982 talks,
Deng had told Thatcher: “China hopes that the recovery can be accomplished
in a peaceful, negotiated manner. But if negotiations fail, China will still re-
cover Hong Kong.” As Xu Jiatun pointed out, “Although ... [Deng] had not
said what means would be used, what he meant was clear,” i.e., Britain would
be pushed aside by unilateral Chinese moves backed as necessary by China’s
military power. Xu deduced several reasons why London in March 1983 aban-
doned its insistence on the legal validity of all three nineteenth-century con-
ventions and agreed instead in the Joint Declaration to a smooth, negotiated
return of Hong Kong to China. One reason was that a negotiated process