592 { China’s Quest
offered Britain “retreat with honor.” Implicitly, a nonnegotiated process
would spoil Britain’s “honor.” Another reason deduced by Xu was that “China
was not Argentina.” Britain was not capable of using the “Falkland Island
approach” with China. One component of China’s preparations for reversion
was preparation of PLA forces in case the failure of negotiations or riots and
turmoil in Hong Kong required China to secure Hong Kong forcibly.^29 To
save British face, Beijing did not publicize Deng’s tough talk to Thatcher. That
would be done only a decade later, when Anglo-Chinese negotiations were
moving toward collapse.
In Robin McLaren’s view, China’s “strongest card” in the negotiations
was its willingness to bear whatever economic sacrifice was necessary to as-
sert China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. Beijing certainly hoped to keep
Hong Kong economically stable and prosperous, and recognized and sought
Britain’s assistance in doing that. But if compelled to choose, Beijing would
uphold and assert China’s absolute sovereignty over the territory whatever the
economic cost. The purpose of negotiations was to see how Britain could co-
operate with the smooth assertion of China’s control over Hong Kong.
Winning the “hearts and minds” of the people of Hong Kong in a “con-
frontational propaganda war” with Britain was a key CCP struggle, according
to Xu Jiatun. This was one of Xu’s major tasks during the 1983–1989 period
of his leadership over the CCP’s Hong Kong organization. This “propaganda
war” paralleled and was linked to the “negotiation battle.” In Xu’s words,
“During the negotiations, to pile more chips on the table, the British con-
stantly tried to influence public opinion, deliberately playing their public
opinion card ... The Chinese side also mobilized their media to coordinate
with the negotiation struggle.”^30 The British claimed that a continuing British
role, or, later, a strong and democratic legislature, was necessary to main-
tain Hong Kong’s prosperity. Without these, a capital flight would pull down
Hong Kong’s economy. Britain propagated these ideas among the Hong Kong
populace in a number of sinister ways, according to Xu. The CCP countered
British efforts via systematic united front work aimed at all strata of Hong
Kong society, but especially at Hong Kong’s business elite. The crux of the
CCP’s united front work was propagating understanding that the “one coun-
try, two systems” program was genuine and substantial, and would remain
unchanged for fifty years after 1997—just as CCP leaders promised. If the
people of Hong Kong could be persuaded of the sincerity of the “one country,
two systems” arrangement, Britain’s efforts to play the “public opinion card”
would fail, and China would be able to call Britain’s bluff, should that be nec-
essary, without endangering Hong Kong’s prosperity.
When Beijing opened the political battle with Britain in the early 1980s,
CCP leaders grossly underestimated the magnitude of the public opinion dif-
ficulties confronting them in Hong Kong. According to Xu Jiatun, China’s
leaders then “assumed there was widespread support among Hong Kong