600 { China’s Quest
China’s view, as represented by Qian Qichen, was that Patten’s approach
“provoked an open dispute” with China and destroyed the possibility of
Sino-British cooperation. It led ultimately to unilateral British suspension of
talks (again Qian’s view), and to the impossibility of “through train” arrange-
ments for reversion.^53 In other words, and again in Qian’s view, Patten and
his democratization plan were instruments of Britain’s new, unilateralist,
and pressure-politics approach to Beijing and Hong Kong.
Chris Patten arrived in Hong Kong determined to expand the element
of democracy in the election of LegCo while remaining within the param-
eters laid out by “the three agreements.” He believed that neither the Joint
Declaration, nor the Qian-Hurd letters, nor the Basic Law had specified
the number and ratio of directly and indirectly elected Legislative Council
(LegCo) seats or specified exactly how those seats were to be elected. That was
what his reforms aimed to fill in. It was this lacuna that Patten’s democratiza-
tion plan proposed to fill in, in the British view.
The organization of scheduled 1995 LegCo elections became the crux of
Patten’s struggle with Beijing. These elections would be the last before rever-
sion. If a “through train” was to be achieved, the terms of these legislators
would have to extend beyond July 1, 1997. This was also the last chance for
Britain to affect the future of Hong Kong’s political set-up. Patten’s reforms
changed the method for electing directly elected seats from two votes to one
vote per voter, a change that benefited the more popular parties—which
tended not to be those closely aligned with Beijing. The most controversial
of his reforms, however, focused on the method of selecting functional seats.
Functional seats represented economic and social sections—business asso-
ciations, professional associations, unions, etc. Prior to the reforms, votes
for functional constituencies were cast by the leaders of constituent associa-
tions.^54 The number of people casting ballots was often quite small, and they
were typically part of Hong Kong’s economic and social elite, not average
citizens. The interests of these associations were often linked to other centers
of power (Hong Kong’s executive organs, the CCP, powerful businesses), and
the people they elected to LegCo often acted accordingly. Patten set out to
make these functional constituencies more democratic. With existing func-
tional constituencies, all the people working within that sector were now
enfranchised, so that not only directors voted. Multiple votes by business-
men who directed several companies were abolished; the principle of one
person, one vote was established. Nine new functional constituencies/seats
were also required as part of the Qian-Hurd January 1990 agreement. For
these, Patten used internationally recognized classifications of industry and
commerce, enfranchising large numbers of average people working within
those new sectors. Again, individual voting replaced corporate voting. In this
way, election to the “functional constituencies” became significantly more
democratic. Patten maintained that these reforms were within the letter of