608 { China’s Quest
PLA Criticism of Deng’s “Weak ” Taiwan PolicyIn September 1992, in the midst of a campaign for re-election as president,
George H. W. Bush sent an emissary to confidentially inform Deng Xiaoping
that the United States would soon announce the sale of one hundred and
fifty F-16 fighters to Taiwan. Bush’s emissary explained that the sale was a
function of the intense election campaign then underway and of Bush’s de-
sire to win the thirty-four electoral votes (second only to California’s fifty-
five) of Texas, where the F-16s would be produced. Bush’s envoy also pointed
out that Bush had a much more positive view of US relations with China
than did his Democratic rival, William Clinton, who was campaigning on a
promise of linking China’s MFN status to human rights and getting tough on
the “butchers of Beijing.”^1 In line with this reasoning, Bush’s representative
pleaded for a restrained Chinese response to the F-16 sale. Deng Xiaoping
acceded to Bush’s request. Deng ruled that Bush’s re-election was in China’s
interest, that the F-16 sale could not be undone, and that in diplomacy conces-
sions were sometimes required; it was not possible always to attack. China’s
response to the F-16 sale was limited to a “strong protest” by the MFA. The
F-16 was an air-superiority fighter that represented a major enhancement of
air capabilities for Taiwan’s air force.^2
While explained by Bush to Deng in terms of US electoral politics, PLA lead-
ers correctly surmised that calculations having to do with the cross-Strait mili-
tary balance underlay the F-16 sale. According to James Lilley, then the assistant
secretary for international security affairs in the Department of Defense, the F-16
sale originated in the Department of Defense as a response to the recent Chinese
purchase from Russia of surface-to-air missiles, KILO class submarines, and ad-
vanced Su-27 air superiority fighters, and was intended to prevent the PLA from
achieving clear military dominance over Taiwan.^3 PLA leaders intuited the real
purpose of the F-16 sale. Deng Xiaoping’s decision to credit Bush’s Washington’s
“election tactics” explanation and his low-keyed response to the F-16 sale caused
dismay in PLA circles. This was the beginning of three years of lobbying by the
PLA for a tougher, military-edged policy toward Taiwan.
Enhancement of Taiwan’s ability to contend for air superiority over the
Taiwan Strait touched on several PLA interests. First of all, it was the PLA
that would have to bear the burden of war with Taiwan if all else failed. The
fact that the CCP regime was beholden to the PLA for the dirty work it did
in June 1989 to keep the CCP in power emboldened PLA leaders to speak
out when CCP leaders got things wrong—as with Deng’s low-key response to
the F-16 sale. The recent evaporation of the Soviet threat, combined with the
increasing challenges from the United States and Taiwan’s democratization,
also prompted the PLA to focus on China’s new threats. Finally, the PLA’s na-
tionalistic organizational culture led it to view itself as the defender of China’s
national interests.^4