Confrontation with the United States } 609
From the standpoint of all of China’s leaders, not only the PLA, the F-16
sale was an unacceptable violation of the three communiqués and of China’s
sovereignty, and part of a US effort to encourage “Taiwan independence”
separatists who wanted to permanently split Taiwan from the Chinese moth-
erland. All of this was, in turn, part of a larger US scheme to pressure, injure
and, if possible, shatter China as part of the US quest for global hegemony.
The differences that emerged within the Chinese leadership at this juncture
were not over the villainy of US and Taiwan moves, but over how forceful
China’s response to those moves should be. The MFA, supported by Deng
until 1995 or so, believed that a low-keyed and nonmilitary response was ap-
propriate. PLA leaders argued that a much stronger and military-edged re-
buff was necessary—something along the lines of the military exercises that
would take place in the Straits from July 1995 to March 1996.
Shortly after the 1992 announcement of the F-16 sale, the CMC convened
an expanded meeting to hear and debate a report drafted by the General
Staff Department. Navy and air force representatives reported on their level
of preparedness for confrontation, and proposed additional measures to fur-
ther heighten preparedness.^5 COSTIND, the military-industrial commis-
sion, reported on the level of preparedness for a challenge in the Strait, along
with proposed research, development, and production measures to further
heighten preparation. The thrust of the meeting was on preparation of a mil-
itary rebuff. The atmosphere of the meeting was heated, with many speak-
ers venting their anger at US duplicity and aggression against China. Deng
Xiaoping’s representative at the meeting, Yang Shangkun, tried to tamp down
emotions by conveying three “instructions” from Deng: 1) except in the event
of large-scale invasion of China, the focus of all work would remain on eco-
nomic development; 2) military modernization should focus on quality, not
quantity; and 3) China should remain calm in responding to the F-16 sale,
which was motivated by Bush’s re-election campaign tactics and not cooked
up by the Taiwan authorities. The CCP Propaganda Department prepared an
intense campaign against US hegemony and power politics. The campaign
went forward, but only after propaganda chief (and Deng loyalist) Li Ruihuan
deleted phrases such as “the main struggle in the world today is between
hegemonism and opposition to hegemonism.” Chen Yun, just below Deng
in authority on the Politburo, criticized Deng’s willingness to strike political
deals with the Western bourgeois class.
The MFA stood its ground and argued in favor of a low-key response. If
the PRC took hard moves, the MFA argued, the United States would prob-
ably respond in kind, and a cycle of mutual retaliation and escalation could
result that would be disastrous for China’s development. Moreover, the F-16
sale had arisen out of Bush’s effort to win re-election, and his success in that
effort was in China’s interest. Bush was an “old friend” of China with personal
connections with Deng Xiaoping and had shown a degree of understanding