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congressional sympathy for Taiwan. Congressional actions also reflected the
mood of the American electorate. Taiwan, long a US friend, recently prosper-
ous, and now a liberal democracy, had the sympathy of a wide swath of the US
public. The PRC, on the other hand, seemed ruled by old-style communists.
In April 1994, Congress passed a bill containing a provision directing the
State Department to review and upgrade ties with Taiwan.^6 President Clinton
did not want another confrontation with China so soon after the MFN-
linkage debacle. Moreover, Clinton’s major focus was on healthcare reform,
for which he needed congressional support. But there was overwhelming con-
gressional support for Taiwan. A presidential veto would probably have failed,
weakening the president’s position on other issues. Clinton therefore signed
the act. After several months, the resulting Taiwan Policy Review (TPR) mar-
ginally upgraded US ties with Taiwan. According to testimony by Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Winston Lord to the Senate Foreign
Relations committee in September 1994, the TPR was the first “systematic
enhancement” of US relations with Taiwan since normalization of US-PRC
relations in January 1979.^7 Through the TPR, “anomalies” in the US-Taiwan
relationship were corrected and US-Taiwan ties strengthened, according to
Lord. While carefully stipulating that US policy continued to be based on the
Three Communiqués and that the United States would maintain merely “un-
official relations with the people of Taiwan,” the TPR upgraded US ties with
Taiwan in several ways. The type, level, and venue of permissible contacts
between US and Taiwan officials were upgraded slightly. US officials could
now, for instance, meet with Taiwan officials in their respective offices, rather
than meeting in some “unofficial” venue as had previously been the case. The
United States would support Taiwan’s membership in international organi-
zations open to nonstate entities and would “look for ways to have Taiwan’s
voice heard in organizations of states where Taiwan’s membership is not pos-
sible.” Taiwan was also to be allowed to use the name “Taipei” in the desig-
nation of Taiwan’s office in the United States, changing that appellation of
that agency from the ambiguous “Coordinating Council for North American
Affairs” to “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” (TECRO).
Taiwan’s top leaders were also to be permitted, as they had been since 1980, to
transit US territory for travel convenience and for normal periods of transits
“but without undertaking any public activities.” “Visits,” as opposed to “tran-
sits,” would not be permitted. This latter stipulation excluding “visits” would
be violated within eight months.
In Beijing, the MFA issued another strong protest in response to the TPR
shifts in US policy. But as with the F-16 sale in 1992, other punitive moves did
not follow. On the contrary, in mid-October, only a month after the results
of the TPR were announced in Washington, a US defense department delega-
tion led by Secretary of Defense William Perry made the first visit to China by
a secretary of defense since 6-4. Perry met with Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Liu