612 { China’s Quest
Huaqing, and held talks with Defense Minister Chi Haotian. In the view of
some PLA leaders, China was rewarding rather than punishing Washington
for upgrading US-Taiwan links via the TPR.
In August 1994, following an understanding between Deng and Chen
Yun, a high-level conference of PLA, party, and state leaders was convened
to respond to PLA pressure and build a consensus over policy toward the
United States and Taiwan. Guided by Deng loyalists, the conference endorsed
a policy of patience, forbearance, and nonuse of military force while pressing
forward with new proposals for cross-Strait relations. So long as Taiwan did
not split from China or experience a “foreign invasion,” China would concen-
trate on economic development for fifteen to twenty years. By then, the stan-
dard of living on the mainland would be much higher, easing fears on Taiwan
that unification might result in declining living standards—or so the confer-
ence concluded. Another fifteen to twenty years of patient waiting would also
make China’s eventual resort to force seem more reasonable.
Following this consensus, Jiang Zemin put his own stamp on Taiwan pol-
icy cast along the nonthreatening, more conciliatory lines favored by Deng
Xiaoping. In January 1995, Jiang promulgated an eight-point proposal for
development of cross-Strait relations. Drafted by the Taiwan Affairs Office of
the State Council and approved by the Politburo, Jiang’s eight-point proposal
(Jiang ba dian) hewed to the “one country, two systems” rubric, but did so in
moderate, nonthreatening terms, and represented a genuine attempt to ap-
peal to the people of Taiwan. The proposal tried to assuage Taiwan concerns
about unification by saying that after unification Taiwan would keep its own
legislature, its own judiciary (including the power of “final adjudication”),
its own armed forces, and its own government. Beijing would not station
troops in Taiwan or send administrative personnel there. The proposal called
for talks between the two sides, but only on the premise of “one China” and
with Taiwan ceasing all words and actions aimed at “creating an independent
Taiwan.” Taiwan was also to stop efforts to increase its international living
space. Under these conditions, Beijing was willing, Jiang’s proposal said, to
discuss any concerns Taiwan might have.^8 From the perspective of CCP lead-
ers and within the context of CCP politics, “Jiang’s eight-point proposal” was
lenient and moderate. It would be difficult to imagine any PRC leader at that
juncture issuing a more generous and lenient proposal—especially a leader
who needed PLA support. Jiang took a political risk by issuing his moderate
eight-point proposal. When Taipei did not respond positively to it, Jiang was
out on a limb.
Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui replied to Jiang’s eight points in April.
Lee, was the leader and probable presidential candidate of the Kuomintang
(KMT) in the future direct popular presidential election (Taiwan’s first). In
his April statement, Lee endorsed the notion of unification, but ruled out
“one country, two systems” as the means. The basis for unification could