614 { China’s Quest
China principle.” The fact that Beijing claimed that Lee and Washington were
pursuing “Taiwan independence” did not make it so.
Chinese diplomats in Washington lobbied hard and with initial suc-
cess to prevent issue of a visa for Lee. In early March, the State Department
announced that Lee would not receive a visa, and gave assurances to Beijing
in this regard. Mounting congressional pressure, urged on by Taipei, forced
Clinton to change positions. Early in May, the House of Representatives voted
396 to 1 supporting a visa for Lee. The Senate vote was 91 to 1. More broadly,
Republican candidates had swept the midterm elections in November 1994,
giving that party control of both houses of Congress for the first time since- Confronting overwhelming congressional opposition, and in an ex-
tremely weak position, with little to gain domestically from siding with
Beijing, and at a personal level not too favorably inclined toward CCP leaders,
Clinton flip-flopped. Lee got his visa.
China’s MFA was taken by surprise by the US issue of a visa for Lee, a fact
that increased MFA vulnerability to hard-liner criticism. At an April meeting,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher had attempted to signal Qian Qichen
that mounting congressional pressure might undo the administration’s ear-
lier decision not to issue a visa. But Qian failed to pick up those signals. When
it became apparent that the MFA had been taken by surprise, critics of that
ministry got new ammunition. Qian had been duped once again by the cun-
ning Americans, hard-line critics said. There were some analysts in the MFA
and Chinese Academy of Social Science who saw US policy shifts not in terms
of US efforts to “split China by encouraging Taiwan independence” but as a
function of less sinister factors such as public opinion, partisan and electoral
competition, and the separation of powers between executive and legislative
branches. In the intensely emotional and nationalist atmosphere of internal
Chinese meetings at this juncture, it was easy for advocates of a more con-
frontational approach to tar as unpatriotic people who tried to mitigate the
evil nature of recent US policy changes toward Taiwan. The voices that had
a more accurate insight into the making of US policy were often cowed by
hard-liners who saw their nuanced explanation of US policy as lack of patri-
otism or perhaps invidious influence by the West.
The US State Department did what it could to keep Lee’s June 1995 visit
low-key and unofficial. Through talks with TECRO, the State Department
stipulated when and how the ROC flag was to be displayed, what themes
Lee’s speech should and should not include, and of course, that no State
Department or executive-branch officials would meet with Lee. In the event,
Lee generally ignored the restrictions demanded by the State Department.
Several senators and many state and local officials met with Lee. Taiwan was,
after all, popular with the American public, and local governments were nei-
ther responsible for US foreign policy nor under the control of the federal
government. Politicians were happy to be seen with a popular, pro-American