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foreign leader. Lee’s speech at Cornell University proudly touted Taiwan’s po-
litical and economic development, offering that experience as a guideline for
the Mainland’s own development. Lee used liberally the name “Republic of
China,” which Beijing found offensive because it connoted, in Beijing’s view,
de jure sovereignty. Crowds of ROC-flag-waving Taiwan and US citizens wel-
comed Lee in cities along his way, while the US media devoted considerable
attention to his activities.
Lee’s 1995 visit to Ithaca, New York, was, in effect, the kickoff of his 1996
presidential campaign.^10 Lee was running as a candidate of the KMT, a party
that traditionally supported unification, but only after democratization of
the mainland’s political system. Lee’s major opposition was the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), which explicitly advocated Taiwan independence.
Lee’s successful US visit garnered support among his opposition’s constituency.
It was shrewd electoral politics. PLA leaders probably had little understanding
of such electoral calculations; their default conclusion was that various US and
Taiwan moves were manifestations of an evil anti-China scheme.
Beijing responded to the US announcement of its decision to grant Lee
a visa with another MFA strong protest expressing “utmost indignation.”
The US move “totally contravened the fundamental principles of the three
joint communiqués,” the protest said. Yet on May 27, five days after the US
visa announcement, the head of Beijing’s Association for Relations Across
the Taiwan Straits (ARATS, a nonofficial organization set up by Beijing to
handle contacts with the “Taiwan authorities”) arrived in Taipei for two days
of talks, which resulted in the announcement of a future meeting of ARATS
and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Beijing. (The SEF was
Taipei’s counterpart to ARATS.) The PLA was livid at US duplicity, at Lee
Teng-hui’s “splittism,” and at MFA weakness. Following Lee’s US visit, the
PLA insisted on forceful military demonstrations to punish Lee and his US
supporters. Jiang Zemin was held partially responsible for recent diplomatic
weakness and failures. Jiang’s political situation required him to be sensitive
to PLA views. Selected as general secretary and designated successor to Deng
Xiaoping only in July 1989, retaining PLA support was absolutely essential
for Jiang. When Deng arranged Jiang’s selection as future paramount leader
shortly after 6-4, he had lobbied PLA leaders to give Jiang their full support.
Deng also appointed several generals in key positions with directions to
strengthen PLA support for Jiang. Following the US visa decision, the same
Deng loyalists appointed in 1989 to strengthen PLA support for Jiang now
conveyed to Jiang PLA views about the need for a tough response to the string
of US “Taiwan independence” provocations.^11 Jiang could not afford to ignore
PLA views as Deng had done in 1992. Had Jiang not heeded PLA lobbying, his
continuation as paramount leader would have been in jeopardy.
Deng had immense authority both as a key member of the PRC’s founding
generation and as architect of China’s amazingly successful about-face from