Confrontation with the United States } 625
U.S. government will handle the Taiwan question on the basis of the one
China policy. The U.S. government is against Taiwan independence and
does not support Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations.^21 (Emphasis
added.)
Within the context of the subtle nuances constituting the diplomatic
anatomy of the Taiwan issue, the phraseology of Clinton’s letter was signif-
icant. It conceded to Beijing several new increments of political ground on
the ultra-sensitive Taiwan issue. The US formulation in the 1972 Shanghai
Communiqué regarding China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan had been
that the United States “does not challenge” the Chinese view. Clinton’s August
1995 letter elevated “does not challenge” to “respects,” implying a greater de-
gree of acceptance than the former. Lack of support for Taiwan’s entry into
the UN was in line with the TPR, but had not previously been stated directly
to China’s leaders or embodied in a bilateral document such as a letter from
one head of state to another. Two years later, during negotiations for the twin
summit visits of Clinton and Jiang, Beijing would push hard for inclusion
of these concessions into a fourth communiqué. Again, Washington would
demure.
To Beijing, Clinton seemed pliable. After staking out a bold position on
MFN linkage early in his first year in office, he backed down. Then he twice
bowed before congressional pressure, once on the Taiwan Policy Review and
again on the visa issue. Then, confronted with the July missile tests, Clinton
offered up a set of concessions on the core issue of the legal status of Taiwan.
Nor had there been any US military response to the “tests.” Beijing’s new pol-
icy of military coercion seemed to be working. There was little indication that
a strong US reaction might maneuver China into an exposed position from
which it might have to withdraw in embarrassment. China’s leaders decided
to move forward with a second round of slightly more provocative missile
diplomacy. In mid-August 1995, Beijing announced another set of “missile
tests” to take place August 15–25 in a parallelogram-shaped area ninety miles
due north of Taiwan. The area of the test was considerably larger than the
first “tests” in July, and continued for ten days, compared to seven for the July
tests. Again, six missiles were fired. Again, foreign ships and aircraft were
warned and avoided the area.
The August missile “tests” were followed by another round of negotiations
with the United States, and then by a still further escalation of pressure. At his
third face-to-face meeting with Clinton, on October 24 in New York City, Jiang
Zemin offered increased cooperation on fighting crime, narcotics traffic, ter-
rorism, and environmental issues, but also stressed the importance of proper
handling of the Taiwan issue for smooth development of Sino-American
cooperation in these areas. The Clinton administration’s objective was to put
the visa issue behind it and downplay conflict over Taiwan. In line with this,