662 { China’s Quest
Sensing a shift in underlying US and PRC capabilities, along with a US
administration committed to strategic reassurance of China, Beijing began
pushing on issues of concern to China. In the words of one official in the
Obama administration, “China senses little drops of blood in the water
better than any country. They sniff out relative changes in power and pur-
sue them.”^43
Barack Obama took office in January 2009 with a strong determination
to form a cooperative partnership with China.^44 In the words of US ambas-
sador to China Jon Huntsman, the Obama China team spent 2009 “building
bridges, getting to know [China’s leaders], ensuring that the new administra-
tion was able to frame our relationship going forward with China in ways
meaningful to both countries.”^45 Washington’s “outreach” to Beijing included
frequent meetings, encounters, and phone calls between Obama, President
Hu Jintao, and Premier Wen Jiabao. It also included melding together two
previously separate annual dialogues into a single cabinet-level Strategic and
Economic Dialogue—a move welcomed by Beijing. President Hu Jintao came
to Washington for the first meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
in July 2009, and President Obama delivered his first major statement on
China policy to a session of that Dialogue. Obama’s speech was a panegyric
to Sino-US cooperation, terming that relationship “as important as any bilat-
eral relationship in the world.” Obama attempted to reassure China that the
United States did not seek to contain China:
Let us be honest: We know that some are wary of the future. Some in
China think that America will try to contain China’s ambitions; some
in America think that there is something to fear in a rising China. I take
a different view. And I believe President Hu takes a different view, as
well. I believe in a future where China is a strong, prosperous and suc-
cessful member of the community of nations; a future when our nations
are partners out of necessity, but also out of opportunity. This future is
not fixed, but is a destination that can be reached if we pursue a sus-
tained dialogue like the ones that you will commence today, and act on
what we hear and what we learn.^46
The result of the perceived shift in underlying power capabilities was
a series of hard Chinese moves probing US resolve. The first came during
Obama’s November 2009 state visit to China. A high point of such a visit had
traditionally been a public address by the American president to the Chinese
people. Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush during their visits had been
allowed live, nationwide television broadcasts. Obama’s China team pushed
for similar openness in the form of a nationally broadcast question and
answer session. The US request was rejected. Obama’s session was broadcast
only to the Shanghai audience (the city where the event was held). Portions of
it were censored. The Chinese audience was also limited to carefully screened