Long Debate over the US Challenge } 667
to meddle in the region, and force countries to choose between China and the
US.”^53 Major General Luo Yuan, the deputy secretary general of the Chinese
Association for Military Science, explained the basis for China’s opposition
to the July exercises in the Sea of Japan. China simply would not tolerate US
military exercises near its coasts. The Yellow Sea was the gateway to China’s
capital and the Bohai economic circle. Historically, invaders had repeatedly
used the Yellow Sea to advance on the Beijing and Tianjin areas. The strategic
bottom line was to nip evil in the bud via preventive diplomacy.^54 In plain
speech, Luo Yuan was saying that China needed to defend itself against a
US military assault on north China’s cities, or perhaps even an American
expeditionary force marching to Beijing. General Luo had taken a US–South
Korean military demonstration clearly directed against North Korea and
transformed it into a demonstration against China. Regarding the sinking
of the Cheonan, General Luo said that the Security Council had called on
all parties to remain calm. Implicitly, the American and South Korean sea
exercises were violations of the Security Council Resolution. Shortly after the
US-South Korean exercises in the Sea of Japan, the PLAN conducted four
days of live fire exercises in the Yellow Sea. The exercises received an unusual
amount of attention from the Chinese media.^55 In effect, Beijing was counter-
ing the US–South Korean naval demonstration, intended to warn Pyongyang,
with a Chinese naval demonstration warning Washington and Seoul. Beijing
had aligned with Pyongyang, which had sunk the Cheonan, against Seoul and
Wa sh i ng ton.
By mid-2010, Washington began responding to the more assertive policies
that followed Beijing’s 2009 strategic recalibration. A turning point came in
March 2010, when Beijing posited US noninterference in China’s immediate
periphery as the necessary quid pro quo for China’s support for yet another
US-sponsored Security Council resolution tightening sanctions on Iran.
Beijing indicated it was willing to go along with another resolution on Iran’s
nuclear program, but insisted that, in exchange, the US promise to respect
China’s “core interests”—as Washington had promised to do in Obama’s
November 2009 joint statement with Hu Jintao. Beijing also informed US
officials that China’s “core interests” included the South China Sea. From
Washington’s perspective, unless Beijing’s efforts met American pushback,
East Asian countries might begin to conclude that prudence required accom-
modation to Beijing’s demands.
US pushback began at an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in
July. Speaking about the South China Sea territorial disputes, Secretary of
State Clinton said that while the United States did not take a side on the mer-
its of those disputes, it had a number of interests in the region, including
freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect
for international law. “We oppose the use or threat of force by any claim-
ant,” Clinton said. Rather than resorting to force or coercion, parties should