672 { China’s Quest
China’s civilian leaders also used summit diplomacy to restabilize the
vital US relationship. Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington (reciprocating Obama’s
November 2009 state visit) was originally scheduled for 2010, but the policy
confrontations of that year forced delay.^70 When the summit finally occurred
in January 2011, one key message was directed inward, toward the Chinese
people and the PLA officer corps. That message was this: China’s leader was
received by the United States with high esteem and respect, and the United
States treats China as a coequal great power. Publication of China’s three
major state-owned newspapers, Renmin ribao, Jiefangjun bao, and Jingji
ribao, was delayed up to eight hours to permit inclusion of reports on Hu’s
joint press conference with Obama and their joint statement. These two
events were held up by China’s media as tangible achievements of Hu’s visit.
Renmin ribao carried three color photographs of Hu’s activities, the full text
of Hu’s speech on the White House South Lawn, and the Joint Statement, all
under the headline “Hu Jintao Held Talks with US President Obama.” Media
reports stressed the fact that Hu was given the highest level of reception—and
also the fact that business deals worth $45 billion were supposedly inked
during Hu’s visit. Anything that might imply US disrespect for China was
censored by China’s media. Questions by US reporters about human rights
issues were blocked from Chinese websites.^71 In terms of the domestic politics
of China’s US policy, all paramount leaders since Deng have needed to dem-
onstrate to the Chinese people—with the full assistance of US leaders—that
a policy of cooperation and partnership with the United States is conducive
to the growth of China’s wealth, power, and status in the world. This is in
contrast to the probable results of the confrontational approach favored by
many in the PLA and by anti-US nationalist public opinion.
Xi Jinping, who succeeded Hu Jintao as President and CMC head in March
2013, took a further step toward restabilizing PRC-US ties by increasing the
level of cooperation with the United States on the litmus-test North Korean
nuclear issue. In May 2013, following a third nuclear weapons test by North
Korea, the Bank of China announced it was closing the accounts of, and sus-
pending transactions with, North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank. This was the
first such move by a Chinese state-owned entity.^72 Given China’s important
role in North Korea’s foreign trade, it was also a painful blow for Pyongyang.
Beijing also agreed to receive a North Korean emissary and conveyed to him
China’s great displeasure with North Korea’s continuing provocations.^73
When Xi and Obama met for their inaugural summit in June, they agreed to
work more closely on North Korea. According to Obama’s National Security
Advisor Tom Donilon, the two agreed that the North Korean nuclear issue
was “a key area of US-China enhanced cooperation, that North Korea had
to denuclearize; that neither country would accept Korea as a nuclear-
armed state, and that they would work together to deepen US-China