690 { China’s Quest
members.^26 Talks with the United States were the most difficult, accord-
ing to Li Lanqing. Li describes US Trade Representative Carla Hills as a
“tough talking lady” “who often wielded a stick and threatened us with
sanctions at the talks.”^27 During a 1991 discussion over China’s protec-
tion of US intellectual property rights (IPR), for instance, Hills “not only
lacked the good faith for cooperation but made an arbitrary attack on us
[China], even accusing China of being an intellectual thief.” Hills had not
found satisfactory a promise by China to cooperate with other countries
to ensure effective IPR protection. PRC representative vice premier Wu Yi,
Hills’ counterpart and incidentally also female, rebutted Hills’ charges that
China was a “thief ” by recounting the alleged behavior of US forces dur-
ing the 1898 eight-power intervention against the Boxers. US forces had
burned, killed, and looted, behavior that was indeed that of a robber, Wu
Yi stated.^28 In another negotiating session, Hills demanded monetary com-
pensation for chemicals and pharmaceuticals produced by Chinese firms
in violation of US patents. Li Lanqing dismissed the demand as “absurd,”
asking who could possibly know how many drugs of a particular type
Chinese firms had produced. Moreover, and more interestingly, Li said
that any Chinese who agreed to pay compensation to the United States
“would be removed from office and punished.”^29
Li Lanqing also had to deal with Chinese resistance to WTO membership.
Addressing the matter of strong opposition from “industrial departments”
that feared competition and insisted that China be allowed to continue pro-
tectionist measures as a “developing country,” Li told his subordinate negoti-
ator (Long Yongtu was China’s key negotiator): “Just bring these people to the
negotiating table and let them speak their minds. Don’t talk on their behalf.
In this way, they can hear what the foreigners have to say, and the foreigners
can also hear out our industrialists.”^30 According to Li, this method was effec-
tive. Gradually, the “departments” adopted “a more overall perspective” less
focused on protecting their narrow interests.
The strong development of market-based Chinese enterprises during
the 1980s and 1990s also prepared the way for slashing tariffs, easing out
quotas and bans, and otherwise opening up China’s markets in prepara-
tion for WTO entry, according to Li Lanqing. China’s technological level
also advanced considerably. This was an especially important factor pre-
paring the way for China’s 1999 WTO proposal, again according to Li.
Dynamic market-based Chinese enterprises had emerged and held the
potential of moving rapidly to meet demand if China’s SOE’s collapsed
under the competitive pressure associated with WTO accession. There
was also growing recognition that insistence on national production
could leave the commanding heights of China’s economy burdened with
poor quality and high costs. Li Lanqing cites the example of negotiations
with Volkswagen circa 1978 regarding establishment of a car factory in