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espionage activities in the United States in the area of military technologies.
There was also strong opposition from US labor organizations to China’s
WTO accession. Labor unions, a core constituency of Clinton’s Democratic
Party, believed (rightly) that accession would lead to greatly expanded trade
and the loss of jobs in the United States.^37 According to Zong Hairen, US
trade negotiators also responded to Zhu’s package of Chinese concessions by
escalating US demands.^38
Zhu’s difficulties were deepened by US disclosure during his visit of the
long list of concessions China was prepared to make. While Zhu was still in
Washington, the office of the US Trade Representative released several quite
detailed documents outlining China’s proposed market opening measures.
This was done without prior consultation with Zhu, much less his consent.
Zhu was angered by the US move, telling his team the move was “a most
arrogant and high-handed imposition, a lack of good faith. Outrageous.”^39
Disappointed with the US response and angry at US unilateral disclosures,
Zhu returned home without an agreement.
In China, criticism of Zhu was intense. Zong Hairen compares the impact
of the US disclosure of what was, after all, China’s negotiating position as “as
strong as a force-six earthquake.” CCP elder Song Ping (one of Li Peng’s early
mentors) called Zhu’s proposed agreement a new “Twenty-one Demands” and
warned that whoever signed that document would be “condemned through
the ages as a traitor.”^40 (The Twenty-one Demands were presented by Japan
to China in 1915 and would have, if implemented, transformed China into
a vassal state.) Li Peng reiterated his belief that “This diplomacy of mollifi-
cation will not bring any good results. Make no mistake: As long as there
are two different systems in the world [i.e., capitalism and socialism] there
cannot be friends. One must not regard enemies as friends and blur things
up.”^41 Jiang Zemin distanced himself from Zhu’s proposed deal. Anti-US sen-
timent flared further on May 8, when US warplanes engaged in the Kosovo
campaign bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade, producing angry Chinese
mobs besieging US diplomatic missions. By mid-1999, tensions in the bilateral
relation threatened to swamp WTO agreement.
Fortunately, the US side shifted during the summer and fall. The US
business community recognized the significance of Beijing’s proposal and
began to mobilize. US pragmatic common sense began to reassert itself, and
opinion gradually shifted back in favor of cooperation with China. Clinton
shifted with public opinion and lobbying pressure. In fall 1999, negotiations
resumed. They were intense but fruitful. In November 1999, agreement was
reached; China was to become a member of the WTO. When the terrorist
attacks on the United States occurred on September 11, 2001, Jiang Zemin
telephoned President George W. Bush to request that China’s WTO acces-
sion not be disrupted by the new US focus on counterterrorism. The United