708 { China’s Quest
measures, their purpose was essentially psychological—to bring foreign lead-
ers to see the error of their ways and repent, opening the way to genuine
friendship, according to Tang Jiaxuan.^4
Throughout the post–Cold War period, Beijing applied this “unity through
struggle” approach to both Japan and India. It did not reassure either Japan or
India about China’s growing power. The result in both cases was that China’s
neighbors became progressively more apprehensive of China’s power. Both Japan
and India became more apprehensive and looked for partners who shared their
concern about China. It is also interesting to note that the same “unity, struggle,
unity” formula was applied by Mao to ties with India and with Moscow circa
1959–1960, did not produce positive results for China in those cases either. There
may be some deep Confucian philosophical roots, or perhaps “barbarian man-
agement” origins, germinating this apparently deeply rooted diplomatic trope.
One broad consequence of Beijing’s efforts to pressure and punish Japan
has been growing conflict and rivalry between these two leading East Asian
powers and historic rivals. In spite of periodic campaigns of friendship diplo-
macy, Beijing did not succeed in making Japan comfortable with China’s
growing power. Instead, Beijing’s policies nudged Tokyo steadily closer to
balancing China, both by building up its own military power and by tighten-
ing security cooperation with the United States and with other Asian nations
(India, Australia, the Philippiines, Indonesia) apprehensive over China’s
growing power. As with China’s US policies, there were moderate voices
within China who urged a more consistently friendly approach to Japan. But
the anti-Japanese nationalist passions fostered in China since 1978 were pow-
erful. The link between regime legitimacy and relations with Japan was per-
haps even stronger and more volatile than with Sino-US ties.
The Beijing Massacre had a strongly negative impact on Japanese public
opinion toward China. Tokyo reflected popular dismay and stayed in step with
Washington after 6-4 by joining international sanctions against Beijing. But,
as discussed in an earlier chapter, Tokyo soon shifted gear and led the Western
countries in lifting sanctions. For several years, Beijing courted Tokyo, prais-
ing its efforts on China’s behalf. In the immediate aftermath of 6-4, Beijing
found it useful to welcome Tokyo’s desire to serve as a bridge between China
and the West, and used that Japanese impulse to erode Western sanctions.
This brief period of Chinese friendship diplomacy lasted until 1993. Then,
less than a year after Emperor Akihito’s October 1992 visit to China, Beijing’s
policy toward Japan began to harden. By 1993, Beijing’s position was much
improved. China had escaped its post-6-4 isolation by striking a bargain with
Washington over the 1991 Iraq War. Deng Xiaoping’s old friend, George H. W.
Bush, had been replaced by a relatively “anti-China” US president, William
Clinton, but China had held firm during the period of maximum danger in
1989–1991. Russian President Yeltsin’s December 1992 visit to China had con-
solidated a friendly relation along that axis. Most important of all, China’s
economy was booming, entering its second period of reform following Deng’s