China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

(Steven Felgate) #1

724 { China’s Quest


respite, tension flared again. In December, two Chinese government vessels
entered into the twelve-nautical-mile territorial zone around the Senkakus.
According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was the first time this had
happened.^36 The Chinese government vessels remained in the area for some
nine hours in spite of calls by the Japan Coast Guard to leave the area. A
“strong protest” made to China via diplomatic channels. Tokyo saw this as an
attempt to change the territorial status quo through force and coercion. The
frequency of entry by “Chinese government and other” vessels into waters
around the Senkakus, according to Japan’s MFA, is shown by Figure 26-5.
A spike in Chinese intrusions (numbering twenty-four) occurred in
September 2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler rammed a Japanese coast
guard vessel. Following the Japanese detention of that boat’s captain in
September 2010, fourteen intrusions into the Senkakus’ twenty-nautical-
mile contiguous zone occurred in October, followed by eight in November.
Prior to September 2010, Chinese boats had left the area when warned to
do so by Japanese coast guard vessels.^37 On this occasion, however, instead
of departing, one Chinese vessel rammed a Japanese coast guard ship, as
clearly shown by video documentation released by Japan.^38 The Japanese
thereupon detained the captain and crew of the Chinese boat, taking
them to Ishigaki in the southern Ryukyus. The captain was charged with
obstructing officers in their line of duty, while the crew was released six
days after the incident.^39 The ramming was an escalation of China’s prac-
tice, although it is still unclear whether it was the result of a high-level
policy decision. Global Times reported one Chinese vessel replying this
way to a Japanese order to leave: “We are a Chinese fisheries administra-
tion boat. The Diaoyu Islands are China’s indigenous territory, and we are
carrying out our official duties in Chinese territorial waters. We ask you to
leave immediately.”^40
China’s pressure succeeded. Seventeen days after Tokyo’s detention of the
trawler captain, Japan’s prosecutors announced that he would be released.
In view of Beijing’s strong reaction, Tokyo understood that unless he was
released, it faced a major downturn in China-Japan relations. Rather than
face those consequences, Tokyo backed down. Beijing’s tough handling of
Japan had been vindicated. The same day the captain arrived back in China
to media acclaim as a national hero, Beijing demanded a Japanese apology
for the incident and monetary compensation. The demand was met in Japan
with anger and disbelief, and promptly rejected. Dropping usual diplomatic
opacity, the Japanese foreign ministry statement said “The demand of the
Chinese side for apology and compensation is completely groundless and
utterly unacceptable to Japan.”^41
Beijing saw Japan’s attempt to try a Chinese fishing boat captain before
Japanese court (the first time Japan had done this) as an attempt to raise the
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