730 { China’s Quest
military alliance with the United States. There is, of course, no way of know-
ing if stronger Chinese friendship policies could have driven a wedge between
Tokyo and Washington. It is pretty clear, however, that while aware of this
possibility and of its desirability for China’s geostrategic position, the broader
thrust of China’s Japan policy was to intimidate Japan into submission—a
course popular with nationalist opinion in China.
Throughout the post–Cold War period, Japan became steadily more ap-
prehensive of China’s growing power combined with the anti-Japanese pas-
sions that flared again and again in China.^54 In January 1994, against the
background of the “Japan-bashing fever” sweeping across China plus China’s
vigorous nuclear weapons testing program, the annual defense White Paper
of Japan’s Self Defense Agency (JSDA—Japan’s de facto ministry of defense)
for the first time expressed concern about the development of China’s mili-
tary power. By 2013, the White Paper referred directly and explicitly to the
threat posed by Chinese action:
China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the waters
and airspace surrounding Japan as exemplified by its intrusions into
Japan’s territorial waters and airspace. ... China has attempted to change
the status quo by force based on its own assertion which is incompatible
with the existing order of international law. ... China has been broadly
and rapidly modernizing its military forces, and has been expanding
and intensifying its activities in its surrounding waters and airspace.
These moves ... are a matter of concern for the region and the interna-
tional community, including Japan.^55
Japan’s 2013 defense White Paper aggregated the PLAN’s gradually inten-
sifying activity in waters near Japan to depict a pattern of creeping Chinese
maritime encirclement. This is shown in Figure 26-6. The White Paper identi-
fied five objectives inspiring these expanding PLAN activities. First, to inter-
cept hostile naval operations in waters as far as possible from China’s coast and
territorial waters. Second, to prevent Taiwan independence, including pre-
venting or defeating intervention by a foreign power in a cross-Strait conflict.
Third, to undermine the effective control of other countries over territories
claimed by China. Fourth, to protect and expand China’s energy exploitation
efforts. Finally, to defend China’s sea lines of communication, including those
delivering Gulf energy resources to China. Several of these Chinese objectives
touched on Japan’s interests. The 2013 White Paper continued: “Given these
objectives and recent trends in China’s maritime activities, it is believed that
China plans to further expand the sphere of its maritime activities, and ex-
pand its operations ... in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China
Sea and the Pacific Ocean as well as the South China Sea.”^56
Japan’s leaders are acutely aware of their island country’s vulnerability to
hostile blockade. The blockade imposed by the US navy in 1944–1945 was a