738 { China’s Quest
If someone suggested otherwise, they were either misinformed or sought to
spoil China-Indian friendship, Beijing insisted. During most of the 1990s,
Indian leaders publicly complied with Beijing’s demand for political correct-
ness. Indian realists, who dominated Indian policy starting in 1998, insisted,
however, on focusing on such impolite realities as China’s strong support for
Pakistan’s military development.
Between 1993 and 1997, Pakistan purchased a whopping fifty one percent of
all PRC arms exports. This included hundreds of main battle tanks, jet fighter
aircraft, antiaircraft and antiship missiles both aircraft- and ship-fired, and
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, as well as shorter-range artillery mis-
siles. China supplied fast attack craft to shoot antiship missiles, considerably
enhancing Pakistan’s naval capabilities. China supplied machinery, equip-
ment, and technical assistance for Pakistan to indigenize defense produc-
tions. China also undertook with Pakistan joint research and development
of new and more advanced tanks, missiles, and jet aircraft. As the United
States disengaged from Pakistan circa 1990 over Pakistan’s uranium enrich-
ment program, China remained Pakistan’s major nuclear partner, rejecting
US demands during the 1996–1997 negotiations that China suspend coop-
eration with Pakistan.^5 Pakistan was China’s vital strategic partner, Beijing
told Washington during those pivotal negotiations. China agreed to suspend
nuclear cooperation with Iran, but not with Pakistan. Stripped of diplomatic
ambiguity, what Beijing meant was that a strong Pakistan was essential to
China’s effort to constrain India. US disengagement from Pakistan also
removed a major obstacle to formation of a new US-India relation, further
raising the danger confronting Beijing—and giving additional importance to
Pakistan as a balance against India.
Coupled with China’s assistance to Pakistan’s military development was
a standing threat of Pakistani entry into a China-India conflict, or Chinese
entry into an India-Pakistan conflict arising out of the still unresolved ter-
ritorial dispute. Beijing would be loath to enter a war between India and
Pakistan, and would certainly do what it could to avoid it. The costs to China
of another war with India would be heavy, perhaps resulting in several more
generations of Indian animosity toward China. But if India were posed to
overwhelm Pakistan, possibly resulting in the further partition of Pakistan
and consequent elimination of the standing threat of a two-front war that
India now faces, China’s leaders might choose to intervene. A war with India
might be deemed necessary to maintain Pakistan’s independence of India
and strength adequate to continue balancing it. A war with India with all
its consequent and heavy costs might be the lesser of two evils. Maintaining
a regional balance of power favorable to China was exactly why China was
prepared to enter the 1965 India-Pakistan war and why it attacked Vietnam
in 1979. It is also, as already argued, the basis for the exceptional stability of
China’s entente with Pakistan.