Reassuring and Unnerving India } 745
commentary in the 1980s; now it briefly reappeared. China also conspicu-
ously increased its military cooperation with Pakistan, supplying missile
guidance systems, motors, and specialty steel. Finally, after Indian leaders
adequately ate Vajpayee’s words by declaring publicly that China was not a
threat to India, the normal condition of Sino-Indian “friendship” returned.
Of course, Beijing’s pressure campaign made New Delhi even more appre-
hensive of Beijing’s ire.
US policy inertia for the several months after India’s May 1998 tests led to
continued US nonproliferation cooperation with China against India. Shortly
after India’s initial round of tests, Clinton used the recently installed hotline
to Beijing (this was the first time it was used) to call Jiang Zemin, urging him
to use his influence to dissuade Pakistan from following India’s lead in testing
nuclear weapons. Jiang agreed to write a letter to Pakistan, and Beijing later
told Washington that the letter had been sent. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen worked together to hammer
out benchmarks for India’s roll-back from nuclear weapons. Beijing and
Washington worked together to draft and pass Security Council Resolution
1172 demanding that both India and Pakistan immediately suspend their nu-
clear weapons program, refrain from weaponization, and cease production of
fissile material and missiles capable of delivering nuclear bombs.
The high point of PRC-US cooperation against India came with the prom-
ulgation of a Sino-US Presidential Joint Statement on South Asia during
Clinton’s state visit to China in June 1998. In it, the two countries pledged
to “continue to work closely together to prevent an accelerating nuclear and
missile arms race in South Asia.” The two countries were committed to “as-
sist where possible, peaceful resolution of difficult and long standing differ-
ences” between India and Pakistan, “including the issue of Kashmir.” India
had long opposed Pakistani efforts to internationalize the Kashmir issue and
insisted instead on settling that issue bilaterally with Pakistan. Now China
and the United States were together proposing to “internationalize” the issue.
The Presidential Joint Statement also “recognized” the respective “responsi-
bilities” of the two countries in South Asia and pledged to “contribute actively
to the maintenance of peace, stability, and security in the region.”^20 From the
Indian perspective, the United States was inviting China to assume a security
role in South Asia!
It is difficult to overstate Indian dismay at the US-PRC Joint Presidential
Statement on South Asia. The United States was responding to India’s request
for US understanding about China’s threat by declaring China a major actor
in South Asian security affairs! While trying to lock India to a nonnuclear
status together with Pakistan, Washington was presuming to dictate to India
in cooperation with Beijing! One good thing about the Joint Presidential
Statement was that the Indian anger it triggered forced Americans to think
through, really for the first time, US geostrategic interests regarding India