Joining the Socialist Camp } 57
of industrial management.^52 The Soviet model, Mao began to believe, reduced
“the masses” to a passive and subordinate condition, prevented party activists
(“reds”) from leading and educating the masses in class struggle, and would,
if allowed to continue, produce a new, extremely powerful, privileged, and
relatively wealthy stratum of “expert” managers. Mao believed this process
was already occurring in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev’s de-Stalinized
socialism, and became increasingly convinced it must not be allowed to
happen in China. Consequently, Mao began to endorse experimentation
with more politically correct forms of industrial organization with reds,
not experts, in command and “the masses” “struggling” via “movements” to
achieve economic or political objectives.
Perhaps half of all Soviet assistance in the 1950s went into military-related
projects.^53 Mao and the CCP, like Stalin and the CPSU, saw development
of military power as a key purpose of industrialization. The Soviet Union
transferred to the PRC the production technology for almost the entire
Soviet arsenal, from tanks and artillery to jet aircraft, submarines, and bal-
listic missiles. Nor were the technology and weapon types backward. A large
portion was up to date. In some cases, production of advanced arms began
in China before the Soviet Union. PLA capabilities advanced very rapidly
via cooperation with the Soviet Union. Like other institutions in Chinese
society, the PLA was reorganized along lines of the Soviet Army. Not until
the appointment of Lin Biao to replace Peng Dehuai in 1959 would the PLA
begin a systematic de-Sovietization of PLA organization and doctrine. Even
then, Soviet influence in the area of doctrine, weapons, and training would
remain very strong.
The Diplomacy of China’s Transition to Socialism
A Soviet-style command economy, collectivized agriculture, and harsh dic-
tatorship were not what the CCP promised when competing with the KMT
for popular support after Japan’s surrender. But Mao and the CCP were
convinced that the Soviet path would quickly make China prosperous and
strong, and place it in the vanguard of the Asian revolutionary camp. While
many Chinese enthusiastically rallied to the CCP’s socialist vision and pro-
gram, many others did not. Mao understood that there would be strong
opposition to transition to socialism ushering in a campaign of hyperindus-
trialization. That opposition would have to be crushed. Once power was in
CCP hands, Mao began creating an international environment conducive to
these immense tasks. Relations with the Western capitalist powers were rup-
tured and the vast Western cultural presence in China uprooted. Education
of the populace, especially Westernized intellectuals, was begun regarding
the nefarious crimes of the Western powers against China, as well as the