764 { China’s Quest
Austria-Hungary, and Britain that Germany’s growing power would not
threaten them. Bismarck sought to isolate France, whom he viewed as the
inveterate enemy of a unified Germany, from potential partners in contain-
ing Germany. Restraint and reassurance were key characteristic of Bismarck’s
diplomacy.^8 Bismarck eschewed colonial conquest precisely because he feared
it would turn Britain against Germany and push it toward alignment with
France. Most significant of all, Bismarck reassured Russia that German power
would not be directed against it. He did this by signing a treaty with Russia
that, in effect, meant that Germany’s other ally, Austria-Hungary, had only a
conditional guarantee by Germany against Russia, Austria-Hungary’s rival in
the Balkans.
There are strong similarities between Bismarck’s and Deng Xiaoping’s
low-profile and restrained diplomacy. Deng quickly scrapped the revolu-
tionary activism that had alienated China’s Southeast Asian neighbors,
pushed for rapprochement with all China’s major neighbors (Japan, India,
Islamic Iran, the Soviet Union), and exploited the strategic triangle to reas-
sure the United States.
After a period of self-restraint under Wilhelm I and Bismarck, new
German leaders shifted course and pursued an assertive policy of Weltmacht
or “world power.” In 1890, Wilhelm II fired Bismarck and took personal con-
trol of Germany’s diplomacy. He then charted a new course for Germany in
world affairs, Weltpolitik or world policy—an effort to establish Germany as
a world power fully equal to other first-rate powers in the world. This meant
inter alia construction of a powerful high-seas fleet of modern battleships
that could threaten Britain’s Royal Navy and thus its ability to maintain com-
munication with its far-flung global empire. German strategists imagined
that this threat would deter British from a war in support of France. In fact, it
produced the opposite result and pushed Britain toward entente with France.
Weltmacht meant too the pursuit of colonies and other foreign holdings in
Asia and Africa. Weltpolitik brought Germany into frequent conflicts with
Britain and France over their respective holdings in Asia and Africa—just
as Bismarck had feared. Even more fatally, Wilhelm II abandoned the treaty
with Russia for the sake of an unequivocal alliance with Vienna. Conflicting
treaty obligations with Petersburg and Vienna seemed illogical and confusing
to Germany’s new leader. Standing alone and now confronting German
power behind Austria in the Balkans, Russia soon moved into alliance with
France. Then Britain joined them, largely out of fear of the threat Germany’s
new high seas battleships posed to Britain’s global empire. This created the
“Triple Entente” of France, Russia, and Britain. Germany had precipitated
its own encirclement by its assertive policies combined with great industrial
and military power. Fearing Germany’s ever-growing power and assertive
policies, the Triple Entente joined together to counter Germany. Germans
at the time, however, viewed the anti-German coalition not as a response to