768 { China’s Quest
sharply with Russia’s economic regression. Criminal syndicates became
powerful in post-communist Russia. The dearth of Western aid to newly
democratic Russia was also noted, as were frequent Western efforts to fur-
ther diminish Russia’s international influence. The West was still hostile to
Russia, Chinese observers concluded, in spite of Russia’s embrace of liberal
democracy. Moscow’s loss of sovereignty over the former Soviet republics also
raised the specter for Chinese intellectuals of Tibetan, Xinjiang, or Taiwanese
independence if China followed the Russian path of adopting liberal demo-
cratic institutions.
The experience of the East Asian “tigers” which had gone through long
periods of developmental authoritarianism also pointed toward the need
for continued authoritarian government in China. The real danger, many
Chinese intellectuals concluded, was that China’s state was too weak, espe-
cially in terms of revenues and control over the economy. To continue rapid
development, the state needed to be strengthened, not weakened by liberal
reform. Politically speaking, this could be done only through the utilization
of nationalism. Traditional Marxist-Leninist themes were simply no longer
effective in legitimizing state authority. Only nationalism would suffice to
strengthen the state in post–Cold War China.
Repeated clashes with the United States over both interests and ideology
also pushed Chinese intellectuals toward nationalistic conclusions. Many
of these conflicts seemed to be over ideological issues—Beijing’s bid to host
the Olympics Games, MFN–human rights linkage, Tibet and treatment of
dissidents, upgrading ties with newly democratic Taiwan, and sanctions in
response to 6-4. Between 1972 and 1988, there had been few disputes with
the United States over issues of China’s internal governance. After 1989, they
proliferated. Why had the United States become so much more concerned
with human rights conditions after the end of the Soviet Union, even though
human rights conditions in China were steadily improving? Chinese won-
dered. Even intellectuals who did not draw sweeping conclusions about US
ulterior motives became tired of continually hearing Western, and especially
American, lectures about how China should reform its backward institutions
to comport with international values. Did not China’s very remarkable devel-
opment record mean there were at least some laudable elements to China’s
system? And why was it that no Chinese economists had won a Nobel Prize
for economics for their contribution to China’s breathtaking developmental
achievements? There seemed to be a pervasive Western bias against China.
Greater familiarity with US society not infrequently contributed to stron-
ger Chinese nationalism. The number of Chinese scholars who visited US
universities greatly increased during the 1990s. Their experiences were often
difficult. Language and financial burdens confronted them. The highly com-
petitive and individualistic nature of US society sometimes combined with
the aloofness of American professors to cause unease. Chinese scholars who