772 { China’s Quest
in imitation of the mode of Western democracy, did not fulfill the fer-
vent desire of the Chinese people for independence and democracy. The
new republic soon collapsed under the onslaught of domestic and for-
eign reactionary forces. ... The Chinese people had still not shaken off
oppression, slavery, and exploitation. ... [T] he Chinese people finally
came to realize that mechanically copying the Western bourgeois
political system and applying it to China would lead them nowhere.
To accomplish the historical task of saving China and triumphing over
imperialism and feudalism, the Chinese people needed ... a totally new
political system.^20
This interpretation justified the CCP’s continued insistence on a Leninist
state. But there was also little doubt that CCP leaders believed these stric-
tures. There was even less doubt that these strictures were taught to China’s
citizens in classrooms and via China’s media. In consequence, US advocacy
of basic civil and political rights for China’s citizens is transformed into an
instrument of hegemonist aggression against China. Since Leninism “saved”
China, the US insistence that China abandon Leninism must mean that the
United States wants to again enslave and dominate China.Aggrieved Nationalism and Chinese Foreign PolicyThe use of aggrieved nationalism to legitimize the authority of the CCP
and individual leaders generated pressure for the CCP to be seen as a tough
and resolute defender of China’s honor and interests. As one scholar put it,
“Because the CCP has built its legitimacy on a reputation as the righter of
past wrongs, it cannot afford to allow the country to be humiliated again.”^21
Having fostered a culture of insecurity and resentment over the many trans-
gressions inflicted on China over the past 150 years, the CCP cannot afford to
be seen as weak in response to contemporary “humiliations.” Not all of China’s
policy disputes with the United States became entangled in the national hu-
miliation complex. During the 1990s, for example, while confrontations with
Washington flared over MFN linkage, Taiwan, and the Belgrade embassy
bombing, Beijing reached agreement with Washington on a number of issues
without mobilizing popular passions, even though negotiations were some-
times long and contentious: accession to the NPT in 1993, compliance with
the MTCR in 1992, signature of the CTBT in 1996, and accession to the WTO
in 1999. In none of these latter policy conflicts did Beijing mobilize Chinese
nationalist anger or try to escalate tensions. It was events which occurred ab-
ruptly and forced themselves onto Chinese public attention through the use
or threatened use of military force—“hot conflicts”—that led Beijing to esca-
late the conflict and mobilize popular anger against Washington.^22