790 { Notes to pages 35–48
- Wu Xiuquan, Eight Years, p. 13.
- Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 122.
- Wu Xiuquan, Eight Years, pp. 17–8.
- Wu Xiuquan, Eight Years, p. 16.
- Taiwan lies on the eastern edge of the continental shelf, allowing submarines based
in Taiwan to quickly enter deep water. Regarding the reorientation of US strategy as a re-
sult of the 1950 treaty, see John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, Nationalist China
and U.S. Cold War Strategy in Asia, Amok: ME Sharpe, 1997, pp. 21–31. - Emily Yaung, “The Impact of the Yalta Agreement on China’s Domestic Politics,
1945–1946,” PhD diss., Kent State University, 1979. - This section is based on Sergey Radchenko, “New Documents on Mongolia and the
Cold War,” CWIHP Bulletin, issue 16 (Fall 2007/Winter 2008), pp. 341–66. This contains
the text of nine documents. - China’s Foreign Relations: A Chronology of Events (1949–1988), Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, 1989, p. 453. - This section is based on Chen Jian, China’s Road, pp. 33–63. Also Chen Xiaolu,
“China’s Policy toward the United States, 1949–1955,” in Harding and Ming, Sino-American
Relations, 1945–1955, pp. 184–97. - Quoted in Chen, China’s Road, p. 40.
- A convenient handbook of recognition data is China’s Foreign Relations:
A Chronology of Events. - Chen, China’s Road, pp. 33–8.
- Quoted in Chen, China’s Road, p. 37.
- Quoted in Chen Xiaolu, “China’s Policy,” p. 185.
- This section is based on Beverly Hooper, China Stands Up: Ending the Western
Presence, 1948–1950, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986. Extraterritoriality was a legal ar-
rangement that placed citizens of certain nationalities in China and certain designated
areas of Chinese cities beyond the jurisdiction of Chinese governmental authority. - The estimate of foreigner population is from my Georgia Tech Shanghai history
colleague Professor Hanchao Lu. In 1919, there were over 350,000 officially registered for-
eigners living in all of China. - There are scholars of the “lost chance” school who argue that CCP uprooting of
the Western presence was a response to the hostile policies of Western governments. Had
Western governments adopted policies friendlier to the PRC, for example by immediately
recognizing it, the CCP might have tolerated portions of the Western presence longer
than it actually did. Hooper debates these scholarly views passim, concluding in favor of
the deep historical forces outlined above. Among the evidence for her conclusion reached
by Hooper is the British case. British business decided early on, with support from
London, to do their utmost to cooperate with China’s new government. This included a
declaration of recognition of the PRC by London on January 6, 1950, a diplomatic act that
London anticipated would lead swiftly to the establishment of ambassadorial relations (as
was usually the case). Beijing was not interested in London’s bid, and British interests in
China fared little better than their American counterparts. - Stalin, like the CCP and even Mao during certain periods, reluctantly allowed
peasants to market “sideline” produce grown on small private plots. Regarding the Soviet
experience, see Alec Nove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R., New York: Pelican, 1972,