China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

818 { Notes to pages 330–338

duty under this doctrine was Iran, but Japan was an obvious candidate. The doctrine was

also called the “Nixon Doctrine.”

35. Michael H.  Armacost and Kenneth B.  Pyle, “Japan and the Engagement of
    China: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination,” NBR Analysis, vol. 12, no. 5 (December
    2001), p. 17.


36. Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 129.


37. Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 129.


38. Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 124.


39. Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 124.


40. Kissinger, On China, p. 283.


41. PRC officials have consistently denied providing assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear
    weapons efforts. Evidence strongly suggests, however, that there was such assistance
    starting in 1974 and continuing into the 1980s. For a fuller exposition of the evidence,
    see John Garver, Protracted Contest:  Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century,
    Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, pp. 324–36.


42. The report was obtained under a Freedom of Information Act request and con-
    veyed by Kyodo news agency. Asian Recorder, September 17–23, 1975, p. 25081.


43. B.  K. Kumar, “Nuclear Nexus between Peking and Islamabad:  An Overview of
    Some Significant Developments,” Issues and Studies 21 (August 1985), pp. 140–50.


44. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated, New Delhi: Vikas, 1979. The reference to
    the June 1976 agreement is on page 221. Bhutto develops his anti-nuclear coup conspiracy
    hypothesis on pp. 107, 137–8, 168–9.


45. Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb:  The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle
    East, New York: Time Books, 1981, p. 218. Also Judith Miller, “U.S. Is Holding Up Peking
    Atom Talks,” New York Times, September 19, 1982, p. 11.


46. Reuters, March 31, 1996. There is an interesting contrast between China’s assistance
    to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons effort in the 1970s and its rejection of a 1965 Indonesian
    request for similar assistance. See Robert M.  Cornejo, “When Sukarno Sought the
    Bomb:  Indonesia’s Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s,” Nonproliferation Review 7
    (Summer 2000), pp. 31–43. Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking’s Relations with
    Revolutionary Movements, New York: Praeger, 1976, pp. 104–8.


47. John Garver, China and Iran:  Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World,
    Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006, pp. 154–5, 223–6.


48. This section follows Garver, China and Iran, pp. 29–56.


49. US construction of facilities on the island began in 1971.


50. A recent and authoritative biography of the shah which draws intriguing parallels
    between his modernization effort and China’s post-1978 drive is Abbas Milani, The Shah,
    London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. For an exegesis of those similarities based on Milani’s
    biography, see John Garver, “China and the Iran Model,” China Currents, forthcoming.


51. “Chinese Foreign Minister Honored at Tehran Dinner,” Xinhua, June 14, 1973,
    quoted in Garver, China and Iran, p. 51, p. 332 n. 47.


52. This interpretation may, of course, be challenged on the grounds that Ji’s declara-
    tion simply intended neutrality and noninvolvement in power rivalry in the Gulf. I think
    the evidence suggests rather that Beijing sees Iran as a rising regional and friendly power
    with which China should, gradually and over an extended period of time, build a strategic
    partnership.