Notes to pages 394–404 } 823
- Deng laid out this view during a November 1978 visit to Singapore and discussion
with that country’s president, Lee Kuan Yew: Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First,
New York: Harpers Collins, 2000, pp. 595–6. - See Robert S. Ross, The Indochina Tangle: China and Vietnamese Policies, 1975–1979,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Also, Chanda, Brother Enemy. - Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 256–7.
- Beijing Review, June 16, 1978, pp. 12–6. Quoted and analyzed in Chanda, Brother
Enemy, p. 27 and p. 417 n. 27. The interval between the peace agreement of January 1973
and PAVN’s initial probing operation in October 1974 was twenty months. - Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 26–7.
- Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, pp. 273–4.
- Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, p. 596.
- Ross, In d o c h i n a Ta ng l e, pp. 128–9.
- Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 188–90.
- Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 239, 234.
- Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 237, 239.
- Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 239.
- Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 232.
- Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 247.
- Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 240–1.
- Nayan Chanda points out that Hanoi’s harsh anti-Chinese policies were not un-
popular with many ordinary Vietnamese. The student volunteers who ransacked Cholon
homes and shops were quite enthusiastic about their work. - Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 20–1.
Chapter 15. The Strategic Triangle and the Four Modernizations
- Regarding China’s role in the war against Japan, see Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell
and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945, New York: Macmillan, 1970. Michael
Scha l ler, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. - Henry Kissinger, On China, New York: Penguin, 2011, pp. 348–9.
- Studies of the US-PRC normalization negotiations include Harry Harding, Fragile
Relationship: The United States and China since 1972, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1992.
Jim Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From
Nixon to Clinton, New York: Knopf, 1999. - Huang Hua, Memoirs, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2008, pp. 345–6.
- There were deep divisions within the administration over alignment with China
against the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was opposed to this, fearing
it would injure American-Soviet relations. National Security Advisor Brzezinski and
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown were the main advocates of a tilt toward Beijing.
Carter generally and increasingly adopted the Brzezinski and Brown approach. See
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor,
1977–1981, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983, pp. 196–233, 403–25. - Huang Hua, Memoirs, p. 347.
- Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy; Key Statements
from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, RL30341, updated March 12, 2001.