China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

842 { Notes to pages 651–662

and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 27, 1999.

In U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 10, no. 5 (June 1999), pp. 16–7.

24. Lampton, Same Bed, p. 60.


25. As told to the author during a visit to the joint venture in summer 1999.


26. This section follows David M.  Finkelstein, “China Reconsiders Its National
    Security:  The Great Peace and Development Debate of 1999,” Project Asia, Regional
    Assessment, Alexandria, VA:  CNA Corporation, December 2000. Also Suettinger,
    Beyond Tiananmen, pp. 373–5.


27. “Bombing of China’s Embassy,” Chinese Law and Government, p. 75


28. Joseph Y.  S. Cheng and King-Lun Ngok, “The 2001  ‘Spy’ Plane Incident
    Revisited: The Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, vol. 9, no. 1 (April
    2004), pp. 63–83. Sheng Lijun, “A New U.S. Asia Policy? Air Collision, Arms Sale, and
    China-U.S. Relations,” Trends in Southeast Asia, no. 8 (June 2001), Institute of Southeast
    Asian Studies, Singapore.


29. Cheng and Ngok, “ ‘Spy’ Plane,” pp. 65–6.


30. Sheng Lijun, “Air Collision,” p. 11.


31. Cheng and Ngok, “ ‘Spy’ Plane, p. 67.


32. Cheng and Ngok, “ ‘Spy’ Plane,” p. 73.


33. Cheng and Ngok, “ ‘Spy’ Plane,” p. 73.


34. See John Garver, “Sino-American Relations in 2001: The Difficult Accommodation
    of Two Great Powers,” International Journal, Spring 2002, pp. 283–310.


35. Garver, “Difficult Accommodation,” p. 304.


36. Regarding Pakistan-Taliban links, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil
    and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.


37. Charles Hutzler, “China’s Quiet, Crucial Role in the War,” Wall Street Journal,
    December 28, 2001.


38. Xinhua, September 30, 2001, in FBIS-CHI-2001-0930.


39. Musharraf in his memoir says nothing about this episode. Indeed, he says exceed-
    ingly little about Pakistan’s relations with China overall. In spite of the importance of
    Pakistan’s ties with China, and in spite of dwelling at great length on Pakistan’s tumul-
    tuous ties with the United States, Musharraf touches in his memoirs on China at only a
    few points regarding economic ties. This fits with a broader pattern of extreme reticence
    by both Beijing and Islamabad in discussing their strategic entente cordiale. See Pervez
    Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, New York: Free Press, 2006.


40. It is sometimes argued that Beijing welcomed the US effort to clear Afghanistan of
    the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which threatened subversion in Xinjiang. I doubt this. China
    already had a very effective mechanism for limiting Taliban injury to China—Pakistan’s
    good offices with the Taliban.


41. Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Mistrust,”
    John L.  Thornton China Center Monograph No. 4 (March 2012), Washington,
    DC: Brookings Institution, 2012, pp. vii–viii, 8–9.


42. Chen Dongxiao, “Zhong mei guanxi de jiben yinsu yu bianliang [Basic factors and
    variables in Sino-US relations],” Qiu Shi, No. 2 (February 2010), available at http://www.
    qstheory.cn/gj/zgwj/201002/t20100202_20343.htm. The author would like to thank D. S.
    Ragan for tracking down this citation.


43. Quoted in Bruce Stokes, “Chinese Checkers,” National Journal, vol. 42, no.  8
    (February 20, 2010), pp. 18–27.