Notes to pages 691–697 } 847
- Li Lanqing, Breaking Through, p. 43–45. It is possible but unlikely that this package
of concessions was decided on by Zhu without Jiang’s consent, as Jiang later implied after
Zhu’s offer met with a US rebuff and failure. Zong Hairen argues that Jiang’s later disas-
sociation of himself from Zhu’s package of concessions and attribution of responsibility
for that package to Zhu was an attempt to shift blame and embarrassment from himself
to Zhu. It seems very unlikely to this author that Zhu would have submitted such a bold
package of concessions without clearing it with at least Jiang if not the entire Politburo. - Li Lanqing, Breaking Through, p. 39.
- Zong, “Visit to the United States,” p. 40.
- Miller, “Dilemmas of Globalization.”
- Zong, “Visit to the United States,” p. 46.
- Zong, “Visit to the United States,” pp. 45–6.
- Zong, “Visit to the United States,” p. 50. The Twenty-one Demands” were a set of
Japanese demands on China in 1915 that would have very greatly strengthened Japanese
influence in China. Their presentation and subsequent disclosure played an important
role in the eruption of popular nationalist movements a few years later. - Zong, “Visit to the United States,” p. 50.
- Regarding the organization of science and technology under the Soviet model,
see Denis F. Simon and Detlef Rehn, Technological Innovation in China: The Case of the
Shanghai Semiconductor Industry, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988. Also Charles Howe,
“Technical Progress and Technology Transfer in a Centrally Planned Economy: The
Experience of the USSR, 1917–1987,” in Chinese Technology Transfer in the 1990s, edited by
Charles Feinstein and Christopher Howe, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997, pp. 62–81. - Regarding the military sector, see Evan A. Feigenbaum, China’s
Techno-warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the
Information Age, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai,
China Builds the Bomb, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, and China’s Strategic
Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1994. - Regarding the reorganization of the 1980s and 1990s, see Shulin Gu, China’s
Industrial Technology: Market Reform and Organizational Change, London: Routledge, - Samuel P. S. Ho and Ralph W. Huenemann, China’s Open Door Policy: The Quest for
Foreign Technology and Capital, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984. - Regarding China’s technology acquisition efforts during the late Mao period, see Hans
Heymann Jr., “Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China,” in China: A Reassessment
of the Economy, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of
the Congress of the United States, July 10, 1975, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 701–4. Nai-Ruenn Chen, “Economic Modern-
ization in Post-Mao China: Policies, Problems, and Prospects,” in Chinese Economy
Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the
Congress of the United States, Volume I, Policy and Performance, 95th Congress, 2nd Session,
Washington: Government Printing Office, November 9, 1978, pp. 192–5. - An important early instance of this is recounted in James Mann, Beijing Jeep: A Case
Study of Western Business in China, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997. - Keith Maskus, “Assessing Coherence of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime
in China,” in “China and India,” special issue, Indian Journal of Economics and Business,